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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On August 2, 2018, then Governor Brian Sandoval announced a comprehensive review of Nevada’s criminal justice system.1 As part of this review, the
Governor tasked the Advisory Committee on the Administration of Justice
(ACAJ) with conducting a thorough evaluation of the state’s criminal justice
system and the development of policy recommendations to be considered during the 80th Session of the Nevada Legislature. In January, the ACAJ released
their final report which revealed that the growth of the Nevada’s carceral state
was driven by the increase in the number of people incarcerated for probation
and parole violations.2 The AJAC report also stated that at least two-thirds of
the incarcerated population entered the system with a sentence for a nonviolent
offense.3 Moreover, the Committee included twenty-five strategic policy recommendations to “improve public safety by holding offenders accountable, reducing recidivism, and increasing the resources available to combat the state’s
behavioral health crisis” and control the growth of the incarcerated population
and corrections costs.4 Noticeably absent from the ACAJ’s recommendations

* This White Paper was written by Brendan McLeod, Forum Editor, and Ebeth R. Palafox,
Nevada Law Editor, with contributions in drafting, editing, and researching by Rebecca
Crooker, Jeffrey Chronister, Joshua Garry, Shaneka Malloyd, Sara Schreiber, and Shannon
Zahm. The Nevada Law Journal would also like to thank Justice James W. Hardesty, Professors Anne Traum and Eve Hanan, and Assemblymen Steve Yeager and Ozzie Fumo for their
support and contributions in topic selection and research.
1 Mary-Sarah Kinner, Governor Sandoval Announces Initiative to Improve Outcomes in
State’s
Criminal
Justice
System
(Aug.
2,
2018),
http://gov.nv.gov/layouts/Page_Style_1.aspx?id=254900 [https://perma.cc/E8BP-QHNK].
2 Steve Yeager, Criminal Justice Reform Can Move Nevada Forward, RENO GAZETTE J.
(Dec. 3, 2018, 2:36 PM), https://www.rgj.com/story/opinion/voices/2018/12/03/criminaljustice-reform-can-move-nevada-forward-yeager/2197000002/
[https://perma.cc/JC7DWDJZ].
3 Id.
4 NEV. ADVISORY COMM’N ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE,
FINAL
REPORT
1,
5
(Jan.
2019),
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are policies regarding pretrial practices—specifically preventative detention
and bail setting practices—despite these issues being at the center of criminal
justice reform conversations in Nevada in the last five years.5
In-state conversations surrounding preventative detention and bail setting
practices mirror those occurring in other states across the country. The growing
consensus across both sides of the aisle6 is that the cash bail system is broken
because it has a disparate effect on indigent individuals and people of color and
their access to justice.7 Most recently, California became the first state to “eliminate” its cash bail system. However, this move drew concerns from criminal
justice reform advocates that it would do more harm than good.8 In particular,
critics expressed concerns that the abolishment of the cash bail system would
authorize expansive power for the courts and increase prosecutorial discretion,
while continuing to have a disparate impact on the poor and people of color.9
Our white paper aims to discuss the issues associated with bail reform,
provide an analysis of bail reform efforts across the country, and purpose possible solutions for obstacles to bail reform in Nevada. The white paper’s proposed recommendations for practical bail reform is a three phase plan to eliminate the injustices that arises from Nevada’s current cash bail model.
Phase One: Eliminate Bail Schedules in Nevada
“Money bail may serve only one legitimate role: to incentivize someone to
return to court as required.”10 Our current bail schedules do not allow for the
consideration of an individual defendant’s circumstances.11 Bail schedules fail
to consider what amount of money would actually incentivize the defendant to

https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/InterimCommittee/REL/Document/13671
[https://perma.cc/B9H7-XWXC] [hereinafter JRI FINAL REPORT]; Kinner, supra note 1.
5 JAMES AUSTIN & ROBIN ALLEN, DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEVADA PRETRIAL RISK
ASSESSMENT
SYSTEM
FINAL
REPORT
1
(2016)
available
at
https://nvcourts.gov/AOC/Templates/documents.aspx?folderID=19312
[https://perma.cc/HRG6-PY4B]. See Assemb. B. 136, 2017 Leg., 79th Legis. Sess. (Nev.
2017); Assemb. B. 17, 2019 Leg., 80th Legis. Sess. (Nev. 2019).
6 Jessica Brand & Jessica Pishko, Bail Reform: Explained, APPEAL (June 14, 2018),
https://theappeal.org/bail-reform-explained-4abb73dd2e8a/ [https://perma.cc/PZ52-7B23].
7 Id.
8 See e.g., Jeremy B. White, California Ended Cash Bail. Why Are So Many Reformers Unhappy
About
It?,
POLITICO
(Aug.
29,
2018),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/08/29/california-abolish-cash-bail-reformersunhappy-219618 [https://perma.cc/R39N-KLLE] (“The ACLU, NAACP and Human Rights
Watch all abandoned their support for a move they initially hailed as a breakthrough for justice and fairness.”).
9 Id.
10 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, HARVARD LAW SCH., MOVING BEYOND MONEY: A
PRIMER ON BAIL REFORM 12 (2016), http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/FINAL-Primer-onBail-Reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/V87P-M64R] [hereinafter MOVING BEYOND MONEY].
11 Id.
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return to court.12 An indigent individual may not be able to afford bail and is
therefore constructively forced into pretrial detention.13 However, a wealthy
individual may find that losing any money posted to bail is “inconsequential”
and thus not an incentive to return to court.14
Phase One would focus on the immediate elimination of bail schedules in
Nevada. By eliminating bail schedules across the state, Nevada can bring to
halt some of the systematic injustices prevalent in pretrial practices. The elimination of bail schedules will allow judges to focus on individuals before them,
while still protecting the community and ensuring the defendant’s appearance
in court.
Phase Two: Implementation of an Algorithmic and Interview Risk assessment
program
Switching from a system based solely on instinct and experience (often referred to as “gut instinct”) to one in which judges have access to scientific, objective risk assessment tools could further the criminal justice system’s central
goals of increasing public safety, reducing crime, and making the most effective, fair, and efficient use of public resources.15 These factors should include
those similar to the Laura and John Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety Assessment (PSA).16
The PSA is designed to predict risk in three areas: risk of failure to appear
(FTA), risk of new criminal activity (NCA), and risk of new violent criminal
activity (NVCA).17 This risk prediction can be based on an automatic system
that draws on the following from court records: 1) age at current arrest; 2) current violent offense; 3) pending charge at the time of the offense; 4) prior disorderly persons conviction; 5) prior indictable convictions; 6) prior violent
convictions; 7) prior failure to appear at a pre-disposition court date in the last
two years; 8) prior failure to appear at a pre-disposition court date more than
two years ago; and 9) prior sentence to incarceration.18 These factors correlate
to each of the three areas with different weight to provide FTA, NCA, and
NVCA scores.19 By using these scores, the PSA provides judges with a recommendation about the conditions of release or detention according to the Deci12

Id.
Id.
14 Id.
15 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N.J. ET AL., THE NEW JERSEY PRETRIAL JUSTICE MANUAL
5–6
(2016),
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?Document
FileKey=b7202610-3480-b5bc-2e6e-7d211059fec4&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/7JCHSC4K] [hereinafter NEW JERSEY PRETRIAL JUSTICE MANUAL].
16 Id. at 7.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 8.
19 Id. at 8–9.
13
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sion Making Framework (DMF).20 The combination of these scores and the
DMF provides judges with recommendations for the least restrictive means of
pretrial release to ensure court appearance and public safety.21
Phase Two would look to the implement an algorithmic based risk assessment tool similar to that suggested by the Supreme Court of Nevada’s Committee to Study Evidence-Based Pretrial Release. However, Phase Two seeks to
establish a more objective based pretrial practice by implementing the use of an
evidence based pretrial risk assessment in conjunction with a pretrial options
matrix. Further, this algorithmic risk assessment tool should be coupled with a
personal interview process. By merging a scientifically-backed algorithmic system with an interview-based model, pretrial services can create individualized
pretrial plans that will account for a defendant’s risk to the community, ensure
their appearance in court, and consider the burden pretrial conditions would
place on a presumptively innocent defendant.
Phase Three: Creation of a Pretrial Agency in Clark County to Coincide with
the Elimination of Cash Bail
Washington D.C. has established a dedicated agency within the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency called the Pretrial Services Agency
(D.C.’s PSA).22 D.C.’s PSA assists the D.C. Superior Court by “formulating
release recommendations and providing supervision and treatment services to
defendants which reasonably assure that those on conditional release return to
court and do not engage in criminal activity pending their trial and/or sentencing.”23 D.C.’s PSA operates under the assumption that reliance on money bail
discriminates against the indigent and does not effectively address public concerns with pretrial release.24
Phase Three create pretrial agencies in counties with populations of over
100,000 people to coincide with the elimination of cash bail. These agencies
would be an alternative to the current system by implementing the risk factor
assessment and interview steps from Phase Two, combined with emerging
technologies to ensure adequate pretrial supervision.
We believe that by following the examples of successful bail reform across
the country and analyzing the failures in other jurisdictions, we can help our
State’s dialogue on the most important issues in the bail reform forum. Our
hope is that this paper will allow Nevada policy makers to understand the many
facets of the bail reform issue, and to make better informed decisions.
20

Id. at 10.
Id.
22 PSA’s
History,
PRETRIAL
SERVS.
AGENCY
FOR
D.C.,
https://www.psa.gov/?q=about/history [https://perma.cc/25UV-MX2Z] (last visited May 3,
2019) [hereinafter PSA’s History].
23 Id.
24 Id.
21
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INTRODUCTION
In 2016, Leslie Turner was arrested in North Las Vegas, Nevada because
she failed to pay for a traffic ticket.25 In the months prior, Ms. Turner struggled
to keep her head above water. Her son was born two months premature, which
resulted in after-birth complications, and was also diagnosed with Clonus, “a
condition that results in involuntary muscle spasms sometimes caused by an
underdeveloped nervous system.”26 Ms. Turner relied on the help of her mother
and Clark County Social Services after the birth of her son so that she could
continue to care for her son and maintain her monthly housing expenses.27
However, her unpaid traffic tickets remained a problem during this difficult
time.28 Nevada is one of thirteen states that treat traffic violations as criminal
infractions.29 When she missed a payment, Ms. Turner called the court to explain her extenuating circumstances, but she was “told she would either have to
attend court or turn herself in.”30
Unfortunately for Ms. Turner, and other similarly situated Nevadans, state
law “does not provide a grace period for individuals on payment plans, and
people who miss a payment can be arrested,” despite an on-time payment history.31 For example, the Las Vegas Township Justice Court website warns that it
25

Jenniffer Solis, Fines & Fees Sent Nursing Mother to Jail for Traffic Tickets, NEV.
CURRENT (June 5, 2018), https://www.nevadacurrent.com/2018/06/05/system-of-fines-andfees-sent-nursing-mother-to-jail-for-traffic-tickets/ [https://perma.cc/ZCE2-9XX2].
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
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“will issue arrest warrants for all unpaid traffic tickets. An additional warrant
fee of $150 and a late fee of $100 will be added to all tickets that proceed into
warrant status.”32 As a result of this policy, a missed payment for a traffic ticket
is recorded as a “failure to appear in court, rendering the person who got the
ticket subject to a bench warrant and arrest.”33 Following her missed payment,
Ms. Turner returned to work to make some money and get back on track with
her payment plan.34 Soon after, Ms. Turner was pulled over, arrested, and incarcerated.35 Her bail was set at $1,500—an amount higher than what she made
in a month.36
Ms. Turner’s story highlights the collateral costs associated with Nevada’s
cash bail system, the role of judicial discretion in bail setting practices, and exposes how a given state’s bail system disproportionately affects marginalized
communities such as the poor and people of color. The general purpose of bail
“is to prevent people from evading their obligation to go to court and to protect
potentially dangerous people from causing harm before their cases are decided.”37 However, “minor offenses like the failure to pay parking tickets” often
results in incarceration at taxpayer expense.38 Under Nevada law, “[b]ail should
not be more than the accused can reasonably be expected to pay under their circumstances . . . , but many judges still impose high bail on those who cannot
afford it.”39 Arguably, an “unreasonably high bail is ‘tantamount to no bail at
all.’ ”40 The inability to pay bail and the resulting lengthy time in jail perpetuates the country’s mass incarceration problem, a political hot button topic in
recent years, though it started decades ago.41 Particular concerns are tied to the
country’s growing jail population which has tripled over the last three decades.42 Interestingly, the United States incarcerates more people before trial

32

Avoid a Warrant for Your Arrest Being Issued, Pay the Fine Or …, LAS VEGAS JUST. CT.,
http://www.lasvegasjusticecourt.us/divisions/traffic_-_citation/pay_the_fine_or.php
[https://perma.cc/M5XT-RCXD] (last visited Mar. 3, 2019).
33 Solis, supra note 25.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. (quoting Nevada Assemblyman Osvaldo Fumo).
41 “The term ‘mass incarceration’ refers to the unique way the [United States] lock[s] up a
vast population in federal and state prisons, as well as local jails.” What is Mass Incarceration?, DANNOTT.COM (May 25, 2016), https://dannott.com/2016/05/25/what-is-massincarceration/ [https://perma.cc/N3VN-4EGV]; see discussion infra Section I.
42 Joshua Aiken, Era of Mass Expansion: Why State Officials Should Fight Jail Growth,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(May
31,
2017),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/jailsovertime.html [https://perma.cc/KR5J-8MV8].
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than most countries have in its prisons and jails combined.43 Additionally, more
than half a million unconvicted and presumably innocent individuals behind
bars remain in jail during the pretrial detention process because they cannot afford to pay bail.44 Reforms to cash bail systems in states across the country,
Nevada included, would begin to undo mass incarceration by targeting a major
cause of overpopulated jails in cities, towns, and municipalities across the
country, and reverse the disparities created by the system.
To this end, this White Paper seeks to address the aforementioned concerns. Part I details mass incarceration in the United States. It begins with its
origin, the expansion, and links the role of pretrial detention in mass incarceration. Part II provides an overview of the cash bail system and reform attempts.
Part III is an analysis and critique of county and municipal tools used to set
bail, such as bail schedules and pretrial risk assessments. Part IV outlines Nevada’s cash bail system and examines current bail reform endeavors in the
state. Part V of this White Paper concludes with recommendations to address
issues with bail, pretrial detention, and mass incarceration in Nevada. This proposal provides the opportunity for reform in three phases: Phase One eliminates
bail schedules and encourages inter-judiciary cooperation; Phase Two works to
eliminate bias in pretrial risk assessments; and Phase Three proposes creating a
pretrial agency in counties with higher populations as cash bail is eliminated in
those areas.
I.

MASS INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES

“The United States is home to 5 percent of the world’s population, but 25 percent of the world’s prisoners. Think about that. Our incarceration rate is four
times higher than China’s. We keep more people behind bars than the top 35
European countries combined.”45
In his remarks at the 2015 NAACP Conference, former President Barack
Obama stressed a devastating truth.46 Nearly half a decade later, the United
States continues to lead the world in rates of incarceration, though our history
reveals that was not always the case.47 In 1972, the United States’ incarcerated
43

Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2018, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(Mar.
14,
2018),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2018.html
[https://perma.cc/5ZYG-ZPEP].
44 Stephanie Wykstra, Bail Reform, Which Could Save Millions of Unconvicted People from
Jail, Explained, VOX.COM (Oct. 17, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/futureperfect/2018/10/17/17955306/bail-reform-criminal-justice-inequality
[https://perma.cc/S6GS-HCEJ].
45 President Barack Obama, Address at the NAACP Conference (July 14, 2015), available
at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/14/remarks-presidentnaacp-conference [https://perma.cc/4S97-T6MS].
46 Id.
47 See JUSTICE POLICY INST., THE PUNISHING DECADE: PRISON AND JAIL ESTIMATES AT THE
MILLENNIUM
(May
2000),

3 NEV. L.J. FORUM 9

Spring 2019]

5/7/2019 10:51 AM

TO BAIL OR NOT TO BAIL

17

population was 300,00048; approximately fifty years later, the population has
risen to 2.3 million people behind bars.49 The sudden rise of the country’s incarcerated population has pushed the criminal justice system to a “tipping
point,” particularly in light of the effect such an immense carceral state has on
civil rights.50 For example, criminal justice reform advocates argue that the
“runaway use of incarceration dehumanizes poor people and people of color,
damages already marginalized communities, does not advance public safety,
and siphons public resources with no social benefit.”51 So, what is to blame for
the sevenfold increase of the country’s incarcerated population?
Our country’s history plays a crucial role in understanding mass incarceration. At its core, this crisis is a product of decades of choices from various levels of political power.52 Starting in the mid-1960s, the punitive transformation
of urban policy implemented by Republicans and Democrats alike, led to the
significant expansion of the carceral state over various administrations.53 In
March 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson declared the federal government’s
War on Crime by signing the Law Enforcement Assistance Act—the first national investment in local control efforts, essentially authorizing the federal
government a direct role in the militarization of local police.54 Later, President
Richard Nixon enacted his own punitive policy by declaring a war on drugs,
which pushed welfare programs to the wayside to invest in policing and punishment.55 Due to the 126% increase in violent crime rates between 1960 and
1970, and anticipating a continued rise in crime, policymakers urged states to

http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/punishing_decade.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9VGY-6E8E].
48 13TH (Kandoo Films, Forward Movement 2016).
49 Wagner & Sawyer, supra note 43.
From the mid-1970s to the mid-’80s, America’s incarceration rate doubled, from about 150 people per 100,000 to about 300 per 100,000. From the mid-’80s to the mid-’90s, it doubled again.
By 2007, it had reached a historic high of 767 people per 100,000, before registering a modest
decline to 707 people per 100,000 in 2012.

Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Black Family in the Age of Mass Incarceration, ATLANTIC (Oct.
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/10/the-black-family-in-the-ageof-mass-incarceration/403246/ [https://perma.cc/NUE3-3RZC].
50 Ending Mass Incarceration, VERA INST. JUST., https://www.vera.org/ending-massincarceration [https://perma.cc/B999-XFHP] (last visited Mar. 3, 2019).
51 Id.
52 See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, THE GROWTH OF
INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (Jeremy
Travis et al. eds., 2014), https://johnjay.jjay.cuny.edu/nrc/NAS_report_on_incarceration.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9SJJ-2XNQ] [hereinafter GROWTH OF INCARCERATION].
53 See id. at 70–130.
54 Id. at 110–11.
55 James Cullen, The History of Mass Incarceration, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jul. 20,
2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/history-mass-incarceration
[https://perma.cc/E3M5-83EK].
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build new correctional facilities.56 In the late 1970s, President Jimmy Carter,
“who campaigned on a promise of equality and opportunity . . . crafted an urban policy that was essentially punitive and discriminatory.”57 Under his administration, housing projects transformed into zones with increased and constant surveillance, as well as increased police presence.58 By the 1980s, crime
control and incarceration dominated the nation’s response to poverty and inequality, a response driven by bad data collection and bad social science.59 From
1984 to 1998, the country experienced a decline in crime, but with continuously
higher incarceration rates.60 Specifically,
states with the largest increases in incarceration experienced, on average, smaller declines in crime than other states. The “above average” states increased their
rate of incarceration by an average of 72% and experienced a 13% decline in
crime, while the rate of incarceration in “below average” states rose by 30% and
crime rates declined by 17%.61

According to the Sentencing Project, the increase in the use of incarceration during this time, and in the decades after, is a result of policies like harsher
drug laws and sentencing policies, rather than an increase in crime rates.62
Decades of punitive and discriminatory policies have resulted in a system
that criminalizes the poor and disproportionately affects communities of color.
56

See Lauren-Brooke “L.B.” Eisen & Oliver Roeder, America’s Faulty Perception of Crime
Rates, BRENNAN CTR. JUST. (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/americasfaulty-perception-crime-rates [https://perma.cc/R4UD-WR3H].
57 Imani Perry, ‘From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime,’ by Elizabeth Hinton, N.Y.
TIMES (May 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/29/books/review/from-the-waron-poverty-to-the-war-on-crime-by-elizabeth-hinton.html [https://perma.cc/2SBC-EVYW].
58 Id.
59 Id. Data reveals that the “relationship between crime and incarceration is more discordant
that it appears.” Coates, supra note 49. For example, despite the increase in violent crime
rates between 1960 and 1970, incarceration actually rates fell. Id.; see also Eisen & Roeder,
supra note 56. Moreover, in the following decade, both the incarceration rate and violent
crime increased. See JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 47. The National Research Council
found that when jurisdictions across the United States enacted these highly punitive policies
and laws, they simultaneously turned away from rehabilitation and reintegration, and failed
to reduce crime. GROWTH OF INCARCERATION, supra note 52, at 128–29. However, even once
crime rates began to drop below the 1970s high, incarceration rates remained high. See Oliver Yates Libaw, Incarceration Rate, Crime Drop Link Disputed, ABCNEWS,
https://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=95580&page=1 [https://perma.cc/SQ6W-7TQG] (last
visited Mar. 3, 2019). One study found that despite a 13 percent reduction in crime between
1991 and 1998, the prison population increased by 72 percent. Id. “The lack of correlation
bolstered the claim that there is no strong relationship between imprisonment and crime.” Id.
These strong measure policies of harsher punishments on crime show that increased incarceration rates are an inefficient method of crime prevention. See GROWTH OF
INCARCERATION, supra note 52, at 155–56.
60 JENNI GAINSBOROUGH & MARC MAUER, DIMINISHING RETURNS: CRIME AND
INCARCERATION
IN
THE
1990S
4
(Sept.
2000),
https://static.prisonpolicy.org/scans/sp/DimRet.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4BE-9UZR].
61 Id.
62 See id. at 17.
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According to the Prison Policy Initiative, communities of color, specifically the
Black community, are overrepresented in the country’s incarcerated population.63 Moreover, the majority of those in prison are poor, the poorest populations being women and people of color.64
A. The Role of Women in Mass Incarceration
Communities of color are not the only major group in the United States adversely affected by incarceration policies. The criminal justice system has had a
profound and unique effect on women; yet, women are noticeably absent from
the larger conversation.65 Although women make up the minority of the incarcerated population, the rate of incarceration for women has grown at an “alarming speed.”66 In the last few decades, the number of women imprisoned overall
increased at twice the rate of growth for men.67 Additionally, states have experienced concerning growth in the rate of incarceration for women.68 Nevada,
for example, where despite women comprising less than ten percent of the inmate population, the state’s female prison population “has grown at four times
the pace of the overall prison population.”69 This growth is evidence of a 39%
increase in the last decade—an imprisonment rate 43% higher than the national
average, per capita.70 Further, the rate of imprisonment for women of color is
striking when compared to white women.71 In 2018, more than 200,000 women
were incarcerated, with nearly 25% of them sitting in jails without a conviction,
awaiting trial, or because they could not afford to pay bail.72
63

Wagner & Sawyer, supra note 43; THE SENTENCING PROJECT, TRENDS IN U.S.
CORRECTIONS
5
(2018),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D39D-F6ZB]
[hereinafter TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS].
64 Wagner & Sawyer, supra note 43.
65 Kelsey Antle, Women and Mass Incarceration, BRENNAN CTR. JUST. (Apr. 29, 2016),
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/women-and-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/3PTZ8FX5].
66 Id.
67 TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS, supra note 63, at 4.
68 See generally Wendy Sawyer, The Gender Divide: Tracking Women’s State Prison
Growth,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(Jan.
9,
2018),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/women_overtime.html [https://perma.cc/4PJT-KJLQ].
69 JRI FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 4; KNPR News Staff, Report: Nevada Prison Population Above Average and Growing, NEV. PUB. RADIO (Sept. 13, 2018),
https://knpr.org/headline/2018-09/report-nevada-prison-population-above-average-andgrowing [https://perma.cc/M54T-HWGF].
70 KNPR News Staff, supra note 69.
71 Compare 49 per every 100,000 white women with ninety-six and sixty-seven per every
100,000 black and Latina women, respectively. TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS, supra note 63,
at 5. Note that the lifetime likelihood of imprisonment of U.S. residents born in 2001 is 1 in
18 and 1 in 45 for black and Latina women, respectively (as compared to the 1 in 111 for
white women). Id.
72 Jessicah Pierre, Mass Incarceration is a Women’s Issue, Too, INST. POL’Y STUDIES (Nov.
1, 2017), https://ips-dc.org/mass-incarceration-womens-issue/ [https://perma.cc/N2DQ-
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The issue is not simply the shocking increase in incarceration rates of
women; the impact of incarceration reaches far beyond the inmate to their families. Currently, more than 120,000 mothers are confined in institutions across
the country.73 Over almost two decades, from 1991 to 2007, “the number of
children under age 18 with a mother in prison more than doubled . . . up 131
percent” whereas “the number of children with a father in prison has only
grown by 77 percent in this time period.”74 Like the overall rates of incarceration, the impacts are particularly apparent for communities of color such that
“[1] in 9 African American children (11.4 percent), 1 in 28 Hispanic children
(3.5 percent) and 1 in 57 white children (1.8 percent) have an incarcerated parent.”75 Thus, “children are particularly susceptible to the domino effect of burdens placed on incarcerated women.”76
B. The Role of Pretrial Detention in Mass Incarceration
By the same token, local jails found in mostly every city and town in the
United States—the “front door” of incarceration—receive only a fraction of the
larger discussion about criminal justice despite the significant role jails play in
mass incarceration.77 According to the Prison Policy Initiative, “99% of the
growth in jails over the last 15 years has been a result of increases in the pretrial population.”78 As of early 2019, more than 462,000, 76% of the country’s
total jail population, are behind bars but have not been convicted of a crime.79
The increase is not a result of heavy criminalization or increased violence, but

ZC4P]; New Report, Women’s Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2018, Reveals How Many
Women Are Locked up in the U.S., Where, and Why, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Nov. 13,
2018),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2018/11/13/mass-incarceration-women-2018/
[https://perma.cc/V73L-D9Z9] [hereinafter Women’s Mass Incarceration].
73 Antle, supra note 65. “80% of women in jail are mothers, and most are the primary caretakers of their children.” Women’s Mass Incarceration, supra note 72.
74 Antle, supra note 65.
75 THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S EFFECT ON ECONOMIC
MOBILITY
4
(2010),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2010/collateralcosts1pdf
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WVW-QJ37].
76 Aleks Kajstura, Women’s Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2018, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2018women.html
[https://perma.cc/84NR-CTLU].
77 Wagner & Sawyer, supra note 43.
78 Peter Wagner, Jails Matter. But Who is Listening, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Aug. 14,
2015), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2015/08/14/jailsmatter/ [https://perma.cc/C3HBHWVF]; Wagner & Sawyer, supra note 43.
79 Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON POL’Y
INSTITUTE
(Mar.
19,
2019),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html
[https://perma.cc/R6HT-L8YL] [hereinafter Whole Pie 2019].
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rather from “discretionary criminal justice policies that increasingly condition[]
release from jail on whether they could pay for bail.”80
Most recently, the mass incarceration epidemic is more and more a result
of pretrial detention practices, which are “fueled by cash bail.”81 Only two
countries in the world—the United States and the Philippines—have cash bail
systems controlled by commercial bail bondsmen that require a defendant to
pay money to be released during the pendency of their case.82 Our country’s
cash bail system exists at the state level, thus many processes and guidelines for
pretrial detention and release exist.83 While preventative detention and bail are
critical parts of the criminal justice system, they adversely impact an accused
person’s life, particularly communities of color and indigent defendants.84 For
example, in some jurisdictions, “less than 10 percent of defendants can pay bail
of less than $1,000.”85 Currently, the median bail is $10,000; median annual
pre-incarceration incomes for people ages 23 to 39 reveal why, for some, release is not a possibility.86
Moreover, the impact on minorities is such that “41.6 percent of black defendants are detained pretrial while only 34.3 percent of white defendants
are.”87 Additionally, “even when charged for the same crimes, black and Hispanic defendants often pay higher bail amounts than white defendants.”88 However, these issues are not newly discovered; decades of research and writing

80

Marc Levin & Ed Chung, Criminal Justice Reform Starts Before the Trial and Sentence,
THEHILL (July 7, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/340931criminal-justice-reform-starts-before-the-trial-and-sentence [https://perma.cc/Q98N-ATP9].
81 Emmeline Clein, Here’s How to Help End Cash Bail, THE NATION (Oct. 25, 2018),
https://www.thenation.com/article/heres-how-to-help-end-cash-bail/
[https://perma.cc/XN3U-KRTB].
82 See Louis Jacobson, Are U.S., Philippines the Only Two Countries with Money Bail?,
POLITIFACT
CAL.
(Oct.
9,
2018,
4:26
PM),
https://www.politifact.com/california/statements/2018/oct/09/gavin-newsom/are-usphilippines-only-two-countries-money-bail/ [https://perma.cc/TU6M-QQK2]. A system controlled by commercial bail bondsmen is outlawed in all other countries. Adam Liptak, Illegal
Globally, Bail for Profit Remains in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/29/us/29bail.html [https://perma.cc/289K-VZPX].
83 National consistency regarding bail does not exist. See generally SHIMA BARADARAN
BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT BAIL IN AMERICA'S CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM (2018).
84 See Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment: The Cautionary Tale of Federal Sentencing,
131 HARV. L. REV. 1125, 1125 (2018); Liana M. Goff, Note, Pricing Justice: The Wasteful
Enterprise of America's Bail System, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 881, 881–84 (2017).
85 BAUGHMAN, supra note 83, at 2.
86 Whole Pie 2019, supra note 79.
87 BAUGHMAN, supra note 83, at 9.
88 Id.
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have highlighted them.89 Yet, legislatures have made minimal strides in introducing meaningful legislation and reform.90
Attached to this aspect of the criminal justice system are significant collateral costs. For example, a defendant detained awaiting trial is more likely to be
convicted if they go to trial.91 Similarly, a defendant is more likely to take a
plea deal if they are denied bail or unable to make bail, and is also three times
more likely to receive prison time than a similarly situated individual who was
released.92 While a defendant is detained, they often lack access to their attorney because of the constraints on the attorney to discuss the various issues in
their case.93 Additionally, a defendant who remains detained will likely lose his
or her job and housing.94 Societal effects include an economic loss because a
person can no longer contribute, in addition to the accrued tax expense to keep
people behind bars during the pendency of their case.95
Among the many factors contributing to mass incarceration, the issue of
pretrial detention and release has been a focus among those seeking criminal
justice reform.96 Jails were intended to house those who are a danger to society
or are a flight risk, but have instead “become massive warehouses primarily for
those too poor to post even low bail [and] too sick.”97 In the United States, approximately three-quarters of a million people are sitting in a municipal or
county jail waiting for their case to progress.98 Roughly 60% of the nationwide
jail population consists of individuals who have yet to be a convicted of a
crime, thus are presumed innocent.99 As discussed above, the burden of incarceration does not affect everyone the same as evidenced by the disparate impact
on low-income communities and communities of color.100 Advocates and legis89

Goff, supra note 84, at 883.
Currently, four states outlaw a cash bail system: Illinois, Kentucky, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Moreover, New Jersey and Alaska very rarely permit money bail. Liptak, supra note 82.
91 BAUGHMAN, supra note 83, at 5.
92 Id. at 5–6.
93 Id. at 7.
94 See Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 420 (2016); Nick Pinto,
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2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html [https://perma.cc/UN4SXBXN].
95 Wiseman, supra note 94.
96 See PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., WHAT’S HAPPENING IN PRETRIAL JUSTICE 1 (Apr. 2019),
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?Document
FileKey=8f6f4242-48c6-def6-5e86-720d6c788efe&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/U5QWYATJ] [hereinafter WHAT’S HAPPENING IN PRETRIAL JUSTICE].
97 VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR: THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA
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(Feb.
2015),
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98 See Pinto, supra note 94.
99 Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1401 (2017).
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lators across the country and the aisle101 are pushing to eliminate or reduce the
reliance on money bail in their states and local jurisdictions in response to reports and research on the shortcomings of pretrial detention systems.102
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CASH BAIL AND REFORM EFFORTS ACROSS THE
COUNTRY
With its roots in medieval England, the bail system used in the United
States has become an integral part of the criminal justice system.103 “Bail is the
temporary release of a person awaiting trial for a crime.”104 During the creation
of the bail system, the main concern was whether a person released would return for future court dates.105 Accordingly, the purpose of bail was to strike the
balance of a defendant’s interest in pretrial liberty and the society’s interest in
ensuring the defendant shows up to future court appearances,106 in addition to
the preservation of the presumption of innocence.107 During this time, all but
the most serious offenders, were likely granted some type of bail.108 Like the
Eighth Amendment, the English Bill of Rights prohibited excessive bail.109 The
United States incorporated the English approach in its own bail system. In the
summer of 1789, the first U.S. Congress passed the Judiciary Act, which granted bail to defendants in non-capital federal criminal cases.110 States, such as
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, followed the federal government’s lead and
established their own bail systems for criminal defendants.111 As a result, monetary bail became the primary means of assuring the presence of the defendant
at trial.112

101

Brand & Pishko, supra note 6.
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103 R. Lamont Kaiser, The Bail System: Is It Acceptable?, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1006
(1968); Pinto, supra note 94 (noting that “[b]y encouraging poor defendants to plead guilty,
bail keeps the system afloat”).
104 BAUGHMAN, supra note 83, at 1.
105 Kaiser, supra note 103, at 1008.
106 Donald B. Verrilli Jr., Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Right to Bail: Historical
Perspectives, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 329–30 (1982).
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the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning.”); Yang, supra note 99, at 1411.
108 TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE ET AL., PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., THE HISTORY OF BAIL AND
PRETRIAL RELEASE 1–2 (2010).
109 Kaiser, supra note 103, at 1007.
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In the 1960s, critics of the bail system began to share their concerns about
the country’s bail system.113 These concerns included “whether the discretionary application of bail was equitable and whether pre-trial detention adversely
affected criminal defendants, particularly those who were too poor to pay.”114
In 1966, the Federal Bail Reform Act—the first major reform to the Judiciary
Act of 1789—was passed.115 Generally, this Act stated that non-capital defendants should be released on their own recognizance or on “personal bonds” unless the judge decided those measures would not assure the defendant’s presence for trial.116 Moreover, the Act permitted judges to consider other factors to
determine a defendant’s flight risk, such as public safety and the defendant’s
criminal record.117 Soon after, various states passed similar legislation.118
In 1970, Congress passed the District of Columbia Crime Bill, which permitted the detention of defendants if they were assessed as a risk to the community.119 Nearly fifteen years later, Congress adopted the 1984 Bail Reform
Act, which adopted similar provisions as the District of Columbia Crime
Bill.120 This Act’s constitutionality was challenged in United States v. Salerno.121 In Salerno, the Court found that pre-trial detention based on a defendant’s risk to the community was constitutional and did not violate his or her
Due Process rights.122 The Court balanced the “government’s interest in preventing crime by arrestees” and a defendant’s right to liberty in making its decision.123 The Court concluded that the government’s interest was legitimate
and compelling, while the defendant’s right to liberty “may, in circumstances
where the government’s interest is sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to the
greater needs of society.”124 As a result of the Salerno decision, the risk to the
community became a prominent factor in determining whether to release a defendant in the federal and state bail system. By 1999, almost every state enacted a statute or established case law regarding pretrial supervised release.125
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution is another important part of the country’s history of cash bail, which states: “Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual pun-

113

Yang, supra note 99, at 1411.
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ishments inflicted.”126 Despite the system’s long history, what constitutes “excessive” bail has yet to be determined, specifically because the Supreme Court
addressed the issue only a handful of times.127 For example, in Stack v. Boyle,
the Court stated: “Bail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth Amendment.”128
However, the Court never stated whether the defendant’s financial ability
should be considered when setting monetary bail. The financial ability of defendants has been a particularly important part of the conversation surrounding
bail reform. Furthermore, whether a defendant has a right to bail is another issue surrounding the Eighth Amendment. Only months after it decided Stack,
the Supreme Court held that a right to bail is a fundamental, not absolute.129
Because bail can be denied to a class of defendants, such as those convicted of
capital murder, bail is not an affirmative right.130 Whether the Eighth Amendment permits preventive detention is still up for debate. There is such little case
law regarding the application of the Eighth Amendment in the realm of bail,
and in most cases, the Fourteenth Amendment becomes the best tool to challenge a bail system.
While the implementation of bail varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,
most states follow what is known as the classic bail system.131In the classic bail
system, the primary goals are to keep the public safe, ensure individuals appear
in court, and respect a defendant’s presumption of innocence.132 Generally, the
process starts following an arrest, when the individual goes before a judge. The
judge then determines whether the defendant will be released before the resolution of the case, released subject to a condition or conditions, or held in for the
pretrial process.133 Any determination to hold the defendant must be based on
significant flight risk or the danger of the defendant being a danger to the
community.134 If the judge determines that the defendant is not a flight risk or
danger to the community, the judge has several options for how to release the
defendant.135 For example, the judge can release the defendant on their own recognizance (a personal promise that the defendant will return for their court appearance), conditional release, or release on a bond.136 A defendant released on
conditional release may be required to fulfill certain requirements to maintain
126
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their freedom.137 These requirements may include checking in with pretrial supervision, drug testing, electronic monitoring, or other conditions established
by the court.138
A defendant may receive one of two types of bonds: secured or unsecured.
A secured bond is an amount of money a defendant can pay to secure their release.139 Whereas, an unsecured bond is the amount of money a defendant will
have to pay if they fail to appear in court.140 Cash bail therefore is the amount
of money a defendant pays as a condition of their release.141 Various methods
are used to set bail regardless of the defendant’s ability to pay, such as a bail
schedule, pretrial algorithms, or judicial discretion.142 When a defendant cannot
afford to pay their bail, they may secure the money from a bail bondsmen for a
non-refundable fee and often some kind of collateral.143
A significant factor affecting an indigent defendant and their potential
freedom is the current bail bonds industry. The percentage of defendants released on a bail bond increased from 24% to 42% between 1994 and 2004.144
While bail bonds can create a “safety valve” on pretrial detention for those who
cannot afford a full bond amount, it can also take pretrial decisions out of the
hands of the court and put them into the hands of private companies.145 Current
bond practices create a paradoxical effect for defendants the court might deem
low risk for failure to appear. Many bail bond companies will not take low
money bail bonds because it is less lucrative than high value ones.146 Accordingly, defendants the court deems less likely to miss court are more likely to be
in pretrial detention.147
The variations in types of bond and within bail setting practices allow for
institutional inequities to create unequal and unjust disparities between defendants based on their race and socioeconomic background. With many jurisdictions realizing the institutional inequities in their current bail systems, policy
makers at the federal, state, and local level have focused on various methods of
reform to ensure that the constitutional right of reasonable bail is available to
all, regardless of wealth or race.148 These efforts to change inadequate pretrial
practices are as varied as the jurisdictions themselves, which can range from
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the most extreme, such as amending State Constitutions and localized efforts to
change practices within existing legal structures.149
A. A Brief History of National Attempts at Bail Reform
“Usually only one factor determines whether a defendant stays in jail before he
comes to trial. That factor is not guilt or innocence. It is not the nature of the
crime. It is not the character of the defendant. The factor is simply money. How
much money does the defendant have?”150
This sentiment stated by Robert F. Kennedy in 1964 was a concern echoed
by many and became the center for three comprehensive waves of bail reform
at the federal level: (1) the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966; (2) the Bail Reform Act of 1984; and (3) the wave of reform in the new millennium.151 The
first two waves established tighter standards and barriers to bail by creating denial of bail based on potential flight risk and reasonably assuring public safety,
while the third wave has sought to balance what many perceive to be an over
emphasis on pretrial detention.
Arguments for bail reform in the 1960s were similar to arguments presently being made for reform. The Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 was based on
two premises: (1) a person’s ability to pay should not determine if they are
jailed; and (2) the danger of non-appearance should be the only consideration
when bail is assessed.152 However, implementation of this Act coincided with
rising crime rates in America.153 This trend prompted advocates to call for the
creation of barriers to pretrial release for those who were a potential flight
risk.154 The Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 thus created a climate where the
courts could hold a suspected criminal without bail based on whether they were
a flight risk.155
The rising crime rates of the late 1960’s lead to the “tough on crime” political culture shift of the 1970’s, which led to the normalization of pretrial detention, whether the defendant’s charged crime was a capital offense or not.156 Using the basis of defendants who might be a “danger to the community,” almost
149
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all states tightened their pretrial release standards by 1980.157 With individual
states leading the charge in creating a “danger to the community” standard, the
federal government soon followed suit. In 1984, Congress passed the Federal
Bail Reform Act of 1984 which enabled judges to detain defendants to “reasonably assure” public safety.158 The United States Supreme Court found the Act
to be constitutionally sound because it afforded defendants a full hearing and
the Act was regulatory in nature.159 With standards for pretrial detention based
around a defendant’s flight risk and risk to the community, some felt that bail
became a burden on the presumptively innocent, poor defendant.160
The United States is now experiencing a third wave of bail reform focused
on facilitating more conducive conditions for pretrial release in hopes of
fighting mass incarceration.161 While the growing carceral state has driven policy change, some calls for change come as a result of public consciousness
about the plight of indigent defendants.162 Despite the Bail Reform Act of
1966’s purpose in ensuring that a defendant’s inability to pay does not mean he
or she remains in jail, statistics show that those most negatively affected by pretrial proceedings are the poor.163 This third wave of bail reform is epitomized
by the Pretrial Justice Institute 3DaysCount campaign.164 3DaysCount seeks to
facilitate reform at state level by modifying existing bail structures to enable
local bail reform.165 The campaign draws its name from a statement made by
Ferguson municipal court representatives who replied: “It’s only three days,”
when asked why they did not track the amount of time defendants spent in jail
before a hearing.166 Advocates for bail reform have found many ways to improve pretrial opportunities so that they are more equitable for all, particularly
through statewide efforts.
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B. State Bail Reform
In recent years, many states enacted legislation relating to pretrial reform,
some specifically focusing on reducing or eliminating the use of cash bail in
their pretrial processes, implementing the use of pretrial risk assessment tools,
and limiting the number of defendants held in jail prior to trial.167 The federal
government seemingly supports state measures for bail reform. For example,
United States Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont introduced a bill to provide
grants to states that seek to implement alternative pretrial systems and lower
pretrial detention populations.168 The bill stated that grants would be withheld
from states continuing to use money bail systems and require studies to show
that pretrial processes are not resulting in disparate effects on those detained
within the process.169 Similar bills were subsequently introduced to the U.S.
House of Representatives.170
In 2018, California passed Senate Bill 10 (SB 10)—the California Money
Bail Reform Act (“the Act”)—which made national news as a significant legislative example of criminal pretrial justice reform and declared California as the
“first” to abolish its state’s cash bail system.171 However, while California’s efforts are bigger in size and thus more notable, other state efforts to overhaul or
reform cash bail systems have taken place in recent years.
1. California: Move Toward Eliminating Cash Bail
California’s correctional facilities have long-struggled with overcrowding,
not only because the state has the largest prison system in the United States,172
but because it “has one of the highest pretrial detention rates in the country.”173
At the core of the California’s pretrial rate is one the “cruelest aspects of the
167

Id. at 10–13.
See Lauren Gambino & Ben Jacobs, Bernie Sanders’ Cash Bail Bill Seeks to End ‘Modern
Day
Debtors’
Prisons’,
GUARDIAN (July 25,
2018,
4:59 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jul/25/bernie-sanders-cash-bail-bill-seeks-toend-modern-day-debtors-prisons [https://perma.cc/M24F-M4ME].
169 Id.
170 See e.g., No Money Bail Act of 2107, H.R. 1437, 115th Cong. § 3 (2017); Bail Fairness
Act of 2018, H.R. 4833, 115th Cong. § 2(b) (2018).
171 Thomas Fuller, California Is the First State to Scrap Cash Bail, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/28/us/california-cash-bail.html
[https://perma.cc/5YYN-F9BJ].
172 Sam Levin, Wealthy Murder Suspect Freed on Bail as Man Accused of Welfare Fraud
Stuck in Jail, GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2017/apr/25/california-bail-system-tiffany-li-joseph-warren [https://perma.cc/HZ2RPZDF].
173 Christine S. Scott-Hayward & Sarah Ottone, Punishing Poverty: California’s Unconstitutional Bail System, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 167, 167 (2018) [hereinafter Scott-Hayward
& Ottone, Punishing Poverty]; see also SONYA TAFOYA, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL.,
PRETRIAL DETENTION AND JAIL CAPACITY IN CALIFORNIA 4 fig.3 (July 2015),
https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_715STR.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2U9-AEME].
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American criminal justice system”: the detention of a person simply accused
for a crime because of their inability to pay bail.174 Most importantly, the
state’s cash bail system reveals notable and widespread disparities.175 To illustrate, Joseph Warren—a sixty-year old, African American man—was charged
with welfare fraud and his was bail set at $75,000, an amount he could not afford to pay.176 As a result, he was left with two options: (1) remain incarcerated
for the pendency of his case, or (2) plead guilty.177 Meanwhile, Tiffany Li—a
wealthy real estate heir—was charged with murder and her bail was set at $35
million.178 She posted $4 million in cash and pledged her $62 million property
for her bail.179 Her ability to pay resulted in house arrest for the pendency of
her case.180 The unfortunate common occurrence of stories like Mr. Warren’s
made bail reform a legislative priority in California.
Under the current system, the eligibility for pretrial release and the factors
considered in making a pretrial release decision are specifically outlined in
provisions of the California constitution, penal code, and the rules of court.181
For example, the state constitution provides that “a person shall be released on
bail by sufficient sureties,” except if charged for any of the enumerated offenses.182 This provision additionally provides that a court cannot require excessive
bail and authorizes the exercise of judicial discretion in granting release on own
recognizance.183 Moreover, each county in the state is required to prepare a uniform bail schedule, which superior court judges are required to review annually
for misdemeanor offenses.184 Pretrial release decisions may also be guided by
evidence based risk assessments.185 However, bail amounts prescribed in bail
schedules and the risk assessment tools vary from county to county.186
After an arrest, a judge assesses the severity of the crime and bail is set in
accordance with the county bail schedule.187 To be released, an individual must

174

Levin, supra note 172.
Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 CAL. CONST. art. 1, §§ 12, 28; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1270, 1268 (West 2019); CAL. R. CT.
4.105 (2018).
182 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
183 Id.
184 CAL. P ENAL CODE §§ 1269b, 1269b(c) (West 2019).
185 Sarah Ottone & Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Pretrial Detention and the Decision to Impose Bail in Southern California, 19 CRIMINOLOGY, CRIM. JUST. L & SOC’Y 24, 28 (2018).
186 See id.
187 CAL. P ENAL CODE § 1269b (West 2019); see also Jazmine Ulloa, Some Say California's
Bail System is Broken. Here's How Two Legislators Plan to Help Fix It, L.A. TIMES (Jun. 13,
2017, 12:05 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-bail-reform-analysis20170609-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/S55T-2XTU].
175

3 NEV. L.J. FORUM 9

Spring 2019]

5/7/2019 10:51 AM

TO BAIL OR NOT TO BAIL

31

either pay their bail in full or pay 10 percent to a bonding company.188 In the
case that a person cannot afford to pay their bail, they must appear before the
judge within forty-eight hours, where the judge will decide what bail the person
should be afforded; at this point, the judge has absolute discretion over the pretrial release.189 Ultimately, a judge has three choices: (1) keep the person detained; (2) release the person on his or her own recognizances; or (3) set bail.190
In deciding the best option, the judge considers the potential danger to people
in the community, other evidence offered by the defendant regarding their ties
to the community, and their ability to post bond.191 After a review of all the relevant factors, the judge makes an individualized decision.192 At this stage, the
judge must set bail in an amount that is “reasonable and sufficient” to ensure
the individual will appear in court.193 In setting bail, the judge may analyze additional factors such as public safety (regarded as the primary or most important factor), the nature of the offense, the individual’s criminal record, and
the probability of the individual appearing at future court appearances.194
The variation of pretrial processes and notable disparities resulting from
these processes at the state and local level revealed the need for serious pretrial
reform in California especially because the state has one of the highest pretrial
rates in the country.195 Moreover, the reform was particularly timely in consideration of the Court of Appeal of California for the First Appellate Division’s
decision concluding that California’s use of bail schedules is unconstitutional
and holding that a judge must consider a defendant’s ability to pay when setting
bail.196 After many failed attempts, bail reform finally made its way to Governor Jerry Brown’s desk in 2018.197 State Senator Robert Herzberg, along with
several co-authors, successfully introduced SB 10.198
At face value, the Act was set to resolve California’s correctional institution overcrowding issue by scraping away at its pretrial detention and implementing a process through which presumptively innocent people would no
longer remain detained simply because they cannot afford bail.199 However, in
the last minutes before its passage, many notable institutions and organizations
188

Ulloa, supra note 187.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 825 (West 2019).
190 CAL. P ENAL CODE §§ 1269b, 1270 (West 2019).
191 In re Humphrey, 228 Cal Rptr. 3d 513 524 (Cal Ct. App. 2018).
192 Scott-Hayward & Ottone, Punishing Poverty, supra note 173, at 171.
193 CAL. P ENAL CODE § 815a (West 2019).
194 See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1270, 1275(a)(1) (West 2019); see also Gray v. Superior Court,
23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 50, 58 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
195 Scott-Hayward & Ottone, Punishing Poverty, supra note 173, at 167.
196 See In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 517, 538.
197 See Kyle Harrison, Note, SB 10: Punishment Before Conviction: Alleviating Economic
Injustice in California with Bail Reform, 49 U. PAC. L. REV. 533, 542 (2018).
198 Id. at 537.
199 SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF S.B. 10., S. 2017-2018,
Reg. Sess., at 12 (Apr. 4, 2017).
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that first supported the Act drew back support.200 Proponents of the Act argued
that the legislation would create a just system that no longer unfairly impacts
people of color and those in poverty, and would decrease jail populations and
enhance public safety.201 It was expected that long-time advocates from criminal justice would similarly support the Act, but that was not the case.202
Aside from the obvious impact the Act would have on the bail bonds industry,203 prominent advocates and organizations claimed this bail reform
would do more harm than good. Prominent progressive organizations, such as
the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California (“ACLU”), argued
that the new law authorized expansive power to the courts and increased prosecutorial discretion.204 The ACLU withdrew its support for the law after it was
amended,205 and expressed disappointment when SB 10 was signed into law by
Governor Brown on August 28, 2018:
[The California Money Bail Reform Act] is not the model for pretrial justice and
racial equity that California should strive for. It cannot guarantee a substantial
reduction in the number of Californians detained while awaiting trial, nor does it
sufficiently address racial bias in pretrial decision making. Indeed, key provisions of the new law create significant new risks and problems. 206

Moreover, the ACLU believed the new law would lead to more people being detained before trial than in the previous system because of the process put
into place by the law which required the California Judicial Council—run by
California judges—to approve the tool each county proposes to use.207 Additionally, the Act contained a provision that widened prosecutorial power by al200

Jenna Lane, Liberal Groups Withdraw Support For Ending Cash Bail In California,
RADIO.COM (Aug. 24, 2018, 11:26 AM), https://kcbsradio.radio.com/blogs/jennalane/liberal-groups-withdraw-support-bill-end-cash-bail-california [https://perma.cc/HKP3LPT4].
201 Harrison, supra note 197, at 545–46.
202 Ulloa, supra note 187.
203 Id.
204 See e.g., Jeremy B. White, California Ended Cash Bail. Why Are So Many Reformers
Unhappy
About
It?,
POLITICO
(Aug.
29,
2018),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/08/29/california-abolish-cash-bail-reformersunhappy-219618 [https://perma.cc/Q9RL-8ULQ] (“The ACLU, NAACP and Human Rights
Watch all abandoned their support for a move they initially hailed as a breakthrough for justice and fairness.”).
205 ACLU of California Changes Position to Oppose Bail Reform Legislation, ACLU S.
CAL. (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.aclusocal.org/en/press-releases/aclu-california-changesposition-oppose-bail-reform-legislation [https://perma.cc/QW2N-27VD] [hereinafter ACLU
S. CAL.].
206 See ACLU of California Statement: Governor Brown Signs Bail Reform Legislation Opposed by ACLU, ACLU N. CAL. (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.aclunc.org/news/aclucalifornia-statement-governor-brown-signs-bail-reform-legislation-opposed-aclu
[https://perma.cc/KG6P-HMBY]; Harrison, supra note 197, at 542.
207 See S.B. 10, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 36 (Cal. 2017) (as amended on Sept. 6, 2017);
Eric Westervelt, California's Bail Overhaul May Do More Harm Than Good, Reformers
Say, NPR (Oct. 2. 2018, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/02/651959950/californiasbail-overhaul-may-do-more-harm-than-good-reformers-say [https://perma.cc/9PD3-97K9].
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lowing the State to file motions for preventative detention.208 Opponents feared
that authority will continue to disproportionately affect people of color and
those living in poverty; thus, the Act would not systemically change the biases
that underlie and perpetuate mass incarceration in California.209
Furthermore, opponents were concerned the computerized system, the pretrial risk assessment tool, would detract from the individualized aspect of deciding bail and result in decisions that reflect social biases.210 This concern is
mainly rooted in the fact that the law is silent on the design of the algorithm.211
On the other hand, supporters of the law argue the pretrial risk assessment tool
would allow judges to make more informed decisions and ensure those classified as a high risk will not be released, though the previous system might have
allowed for that opportunity.212 Under the new system, each county would have
the discretion to set its own pretrial assessment tools which critics fear will allow biased assessment tools to negatively impact those who are most vulnerable.213
The enactment of the Act would overhaul California’s cash bail system entirely. As passed, the Act repeals “existing laws regarding bail and require that
any remaining references to bail refer to the procedures specified in the bill,”214
The Act attempts to safely reduce the number of defendants incarcerated only
because they cannot afford to post bail.215 Most notably, the Act eliminates the
monetary aspect of California’s current bail statutes and replaces it with “ ‘risk
assessments’ and other nonmonetary conditions.”216 To do this, the law requires
each Superior Court to have an entity, division, or program that provides pretrial risk assessment services that would “assess the risk level of persons charged
with the commission of a crime, report the results of the risk determination to

208
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the court, and make recommendations for conditions of release of individuals
pending adjudication of their criminal case.”217
Under the Pretrial Assessment Services program, arrested individuals are
categorized into low, medium, or high risk:218
(b) “High risk” means that an arrested person, after determination of the person’s risk following an investigation by Pretrial Assessment Services, including
the use of a validated risk assessment tool, is categorized as having a significant
level of risk of failure to appear in court as required or risk to public safety due
to the commission of a new criminal offense while released on the current criminal offense.
(c) “Low risk” means that an arrested person, after determination of the person’s
risk following an investigation by Pretrial Assessment Services, including the
use of a validated risk assessment tool, is categorized as having a minimal level
of risk of failure to appear in court as required or risk to public safety due to the
commission of a new criminal offense while released on the current criminal offense.
(d) “Medium Risk” means that an arrested person, after determination of the
person’s risk following an investigation by Pretrial Assessment Services, including the use of a validated risk assessment tool, is categorized as having a moderate level of risk of failure to appear in court as required or risk to public safety
due to the commission of a new criminal offense while released on the current
criminal offense.

The Act specifies that a person arrested for a misdemeanor is booked and
released within twelve hours without having a pretrial risk assessment, except
as otherwise specified.219 A person classified as a low risk is to be released on
his or her own recognizance.220 When defendants are categorized as a medium
risk, the Superior Court is required to create a rule for Pretrial Assessment Services to follow permitting the release of the medium risk individual on their
own recognizance or supervised own recognizance.221 In the case where an individual is categorized as a high risk, the defendant is not to be released and
must wait for their arraignment where a judge determines the defendant’s release.222
However, it could often be the case that an individual is not released
through the methods explained above. For those instances, the Act authorizes
the court to hold a pre-arraignment review to determine whether certain conditions would allow a safe release of the defendant to assure public safety and the
defendant’s return to court.223 Moreover, at any time during the arraignment or
the pendency of the case, the prosecution may file a motion for preventative de217
218
219
220
221
222
223

S.B. 10, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (as amended on Aug. 20, 2018).
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tention.224 Once filed, a preventative detention hearing will take place.225 At the
hearing, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions or combination of conditions will reasonably assure public safety and the
defendant will appear to future court dates.226 That finding must be made on the
record.227
This Golden State “victory,” however, for the proponents of the Act was
short lived. After the passage of the Act, the bail industry worked quickly to
require the question of whether to implement SB 10 to be put forth to California voters as a referendum in 2020.228 This roadblock has not stopped other judicial and legislative reforms related to bail throughout the state. For example,
Governor Gavin Newsom allocated $75 million to support courts’ experiments
with alternatives to bail under the direction of a Judicial Council specifically
created to “advise counties on how to implement alternatives to bail.”229 Additionally, the State Supreme Court will soon rule on a case said to provide immediate changes to the state’s pretrial process.230
As briefly discussed above, the Court of Appeal of California for the First
Appellate Division decision concluded that California’s use of bail schedules is
unconstitutional and held that a judge must consider a defendant’s ability to pay
when setting bail.231 This case involves Kenneth Humphrey whose bail was
originally set at $600,000 after being charged “with burglary and robbery based
on allegations that he followed a fellow resident of his senior living facility into
his apartment and stole $5 and a bottle of cologne.”232 Mr. Humphrey’s bail
was later reduced to $350,000, an amount he could still not afford to pay.233
The California State Supreme Court has an opportunity to uphold the Court of
Appeal’s decision to effectuate an immediate change in the state’s pretrial processes.234 That change would require “prosecutors to prove that a person is too
dangerous to be released—and if they[] [are] not, to set reasonable conditions
for their freedom before trial.”235
224
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Id. If the defendant is detained when the motion is filed, the court must hold a preventive
detention hearing no later than 3 days after the motion is filed, and should give notice to the
victim. Id.
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228 Marisa Lagos, Ending Cash Bail Is on Hold Until 2020, But Critics Aren’t Waiting to
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Additionally, while the fate of SB 10 is unknown, the bill’s author, State
Sen. Robert Hertzberg, proposed new “legislation that would require any counties experimenting with alternatives to bail to collect data on who is being released and under what conditions” with the goal of using the information to
“ensure that the same economic and racial inequities that exist under the existing bail system do[] [not] continue [to] persist under alternatives to bail.”236
Moreover, with the uncertainty surrounding the future of the state’s cash
bail system, the University of California Los Angeles School of Law wasted no
time implementing change. UCLA School of Law’s criminal justice program
partnered with the Bail Project, the Bronx Defenders, and the Los Angeles
County Public Defender’s office to launch a pilot program in Compton, California.237 The intended goal is to reduce or eliminate bail “for people who have
been charged with felonies and who might face lengthy pretrial stays behind
bars only because they cannot afford bail.”238 The program called for UCLA
law students to work alongside public defenders at the Los Angeles Superior
Court in Compton.239 Compton served as the perfect “petri dish” because seven
out of every ten clients in the Los Angeles County Public Defender’s Compton
branch cannot afford bail and wait in jail while their attorney argues their
case.240 Though the program is still new, of the fourteen people the pilot program has represented, eleven secured a bail reduction and pretrial release.241
Other documented successes include:
•The court allowed for the release of six clients on their own recognizance
after incarceration periods of between five and sixteen weeks and
where bail was set between $30,000 and $70,000.
•Three of the six clients “were ordered into drug-treatment facilities where
they maintained contact with their families and jobs while awaiting trial.”
•Another client had their bail reduced from $30,000 to $3,000. The client’s
bail was paid by the Bail Project to allow for the client’s release during
the pendency of his case., which was later dismissed.242

In re Humphrey has also made asking for bail reductions easier because the
state appellate court ruled that when setting bail, a judge should consider a de236

Id.; see S.B. 36, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as amended on Mar. 13, 2019).
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fendant’s ability to pay.243 Program leaders hope their efforts “shift the culture”
by proving to judges that releasing people on low or no bail has no correlation
to whether someone will make their court appearance or increases rates of
crime.244 In its short time, the pilot program has demonstrated success and
leaders are motivated to expand to other counties with significant amounts of
presumably innocent people in jail because they cannot afford bail.245
2. D.C. Bail Reform: Creation of a Dedicated Pretrial Service Agency
The policy push to eliminate cash bail in California is not a new concept.246
In 1992, Washington, D.C. eliminated cash bail and established a dedicated
agency within the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency called the
Pretrial Services Agency (“D.C.’s PSA”).247 This program is statutorily precluded from supervising surety bail releases from the D.C. Superior Court.248
Moreover, the program assists both the D.C. Superior Court and the U.S. District Court by “formulating release recommendations and providing supervision
and treatment services to defendants which reasonably assure that those on
conditional release return to court and do not engage in criminal activity pending their trial and/or sentencing.”249 The program has several goals including
maintaining a defendant’s presumption of innocence while using pro-social interventions, effective use of technology, and human capital to secure the nonfinancial conditional release of defendants.250 Additionally, the D.C. PSA operates under the assumption that reliance on money bail discriminates against the
indigent and does not effectively address public concerns with pretrial release.251
Currently, the program fulfills its mission by both gathering information on
defendants and then supervising defendants released from custody, as well as
providing the judiciary with “objective, verified” data to allow for the best decision.252 Information is collected through a “client,” rather than defendant, interview conducted by the D.C. PSA program officer with the purpose of gather243
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ing information on seventy factors later recorded in a database that calculates
the client’s risk of flight or potential for committing another crime.253 Officers
then present this information to judicial officers to recommend the least restrictive conditions for release, while maintaining public safety and ensuring a return to court.254 Ultimately, the decision of a defendant’s release or stay in custody rests with a judicial officer.255 The combination of the interview, use of a
risk assessment algorithm, and recommendation by D.C.’s PSA allows a judge
to gauge a person’s “likelihood of succeeding.”256
Following the judiciary’s decision, the agency continues to supervise defendants released from custody to ensure they are complying with conditions of
release.257 The agency gives defendants the opportunity to participate in prosocial interventions and reminders to help assure they appear for their schedule
court hearing.258 Moreover, the program offers an established line of communication with all parties by notifying the prosecution, defense, and court of the
client’s compliance or non-compliance to allow parties to promptly respond to
any violations.259 Establishing these lines of communication has proven to be
an important way to keep the program working toward its goal. A recent study
by the University of Chicago found that receiving any pre-court message reduced failure to appear rates by 21%.260 Further, the study revealed that making
use of consequence-based messages (those stating what would happen should a
defendant fail to appear in court) combined with plan-making messages (reminders to help defendants think ahead) were more effective than consequence
or reminders alone.261 The hope is that this continued monitoring and reporting

253
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AGENCY
FOR
D.C.,
https://www.psa.gov/?q=programs/treatment_services
[https://perma.cc/6BA9-4N87] (last visited Apr. 27, 2019).
259 PSA’s Role in Criminal Justice, supra note 252.
260 BRICE COOK ET AL., UNIV. OF CHICAGO CRIME LAB, USING BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE TO
IMPROVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE OUTCOMES: PREVENTING FAILURES TO APPEAR IN COURT 10–15
(Jan.
2018),
https://urbanlabs.uchicago.edu/attachments/3b31252760b28d3b44ad1a8d964d0f1e9128af34/
store/9c86b123e3b00a5da58318f438a6e787dd01d66d0efad54d66aa232a6473/I42954_NYCSummonsPaper_Final_Mar2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L6M-VY52] [hereinafter
USING BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE OUTCOMES].
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will minimize pretrial detention, reduce jail crowding, and ensure that pretrial
services are administered fairly while promoting public safety.262
D.C. has had quantifiable success with their system. In fiscal year 2017,
D.C. released 94% of arrestees at their arraignment.263 Moreover, the D.C. Judiciary agreed with 76% of D.C.’s PSA recommendations.264 Of those released
for any crime, 88% remained arrest-free, with 99% of those on release for a violent crime remaining arrest-free.265 Further, 88% of clients made all their
scheduled court appearances and 87% remained on continued pretrial release
without a request for removal or revocation for non-compliance.266
However, D.C.’s program is not without its criticisms. In May of 2016, a
defendant out on pretrial release bypassed a court-ordered monitoring device by
detaching his prosthetic leg and then fatally shot a woman.267 Additionally, on
July 4, 2015, a man released on a misdemeanor charge of assaulting a police
officer fatally stabbed a passenger on D.C.’s metro.268 Further, D.C.’s statistics
relating to re-arrest numbers of defendants on pretrial release are not conclusive
of a lack of crime, just indicative of simply not being caught.
D.C.’s PSA has effectively built a system that all but eliminates cash bail.
Thus, jurisdictions wanting to develop or reform their own pretrial services
should look to D.C.’s PSA as a model of certain successes. By implementing an
agency that focuses on combining technology and human capital, pretrial service agencies can create individualized plans that more readily meet the needs
of defendants and constructively eliminate cash bail.
3. New Jersey’s Approach: Algorithmic Pretrial Assessment
One attempt to curb the injustice of current bail systems is to implement
the use of risk assessment tools developed by universities, governments, and
nonprofit agencies.269 A prime example of this is New Jersey’s move from
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money bail to a risk assessment system in 2017.270 Following a report showing
that on a single day 5,000 people in New Jersey were able to be released on bail
but could not afford it, the New Jersey Supreme Court established a committee
in 2013 to examine issues related to bail and pretrial reform.271 The committee
recommended significant changes to New Jersey’s pretrial practices and criminal justice system.272 The committee suggested that the state move from a cashbased system of pretrial release to a risk-based system, create and implement a
pretrial supervision process, and make preventative detention the rarity.273
These recommendations became law in New Jersey and took effect in January
2017.274 Switching from a system based solely on instinct and experience (often
referred to as “gut instinct”) to one in which judges have access to scientific,
objective risk assessment tools could further the criminal justice system’s central goals of increasing public safety, reducing crime, and making the most effective, fair, and efficient use of public resources.275
New Jersey turned to the Laura and John Arnold Foundation (LJAF) for
the implementation of a “scientific, objective” risk assessment tool.276 LJAF’s
risk assessment tool, known as the Public Safety Assessment (PSA), is designed to predict risk in three areas: risk of failure to appear (FTA), risk of new
criminal activity (NCA), and risk of new violent criminal activity (NVCA).277
The PSA is designed to make this assessment without a defendant interview
based on nine factors drawn from court records, which include:278
1. age at current arrest . . . .
2. current violent offense . . . .
3. pending charge at the time of the offense . . . .
4. prior disorderly persons conviction . . . .
5. prior indictable convictions . . . .
6. prior violent conviction . . . .
7. prior failure to appear at a pre-disposition court date in the last two
years . . . .
8. prior failure to appear at a pre-disposition court date more than two
years ago . . . .
9. prior sentence to incarceration . . . .279
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https://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2017/02/hows_njs_massive_bail_overhaul_working_o
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These nine factors are used to determine scores from one to six in the three
areas that the PSA seeks to predict.280 By using these scores, the PSA provides
judges with a recommendation about the conditions of release or detention according to the Decision Making Framework (DMF).281 The PSA would recommend a defendant with a new criminal activity (NCA) score of one and a
failure to appear (FTA) score of two be released on their own recognizance.282
Whereas, a defendant with a new criminal activity (NCA) score of five and an
FTA score of three would receive release on a Pretrial Monitoring Level (PML)
of three. A defendant receives a “risk of new violent criminal activity” (NVCA)
flag based on the nature of their current charge and prior criminal convictions,
meaning that it is less likely for a defendant flagged for violent crimes to be
recommended for release.283 For example, if a defendant’s PSA scores result in
a NVCA flag, and their current offense is violent, then the DMF will not recommend release or will recommend release on the most restrictive conditions.284 Judges may depart from the recommendations created by the PSA and
DMF, but must explain their reasons for doing so.285
New Jersey hopes that this model will curb the system’s bias towards detention, develop a better understanding of which defendants pose a greater risk
of flight or danger, and help to eliminate all biases in the system. 286 However,
the system is not above critique. Many factors that the PSA is built on can be
“profoundly affected by race, class, neighborhood and the ability to afford a
lawyer.”287 Indeed, Marie VanNostrand, the “architect” of the PSA, stated herself that “[w]e can[not] eliminate bias, but we can disrupt the cycle of bias and
that[] [is] what this tool is intended to do.”288
Following the first year of using the PSA in New Jersey, pretrial jail populations fell by 20%, from 7,173 on January 2017, to 5,743 on December
2017.289 Soon after the adoption and implementation of the PSA and DMF, the
Pretrial Justice Institute released a state by state report on the status of pretrial
Justice in America and gave New Jersey the only “A grade” in its state by state
survey.290 However, in its own report, the New Jersey Judiciary addressed chal-
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lenges related to the new criminal justice reforms.291 The main three challenges
the judiciary highlighted were: the ongoing funding of the Pretrial Services
Program via court fees is “simply not sustainable”; the inability of staff to assist
defendants with mental health, housing, or substance abuse; and issues related
to electronic monitoring of defendants on pretrial release.292
Despite these potential challenges, algorithmic pretrial assessments are
gaining traction across America. The PSA is used in Arizona, Kentucky, Rhode
Island, and Utah.293 The major metropolitan areas of Chicago, Houston, and
New Orleans have also adopted the PSA’s risk assessment model used by New
Jersey.294 In New Orleans, the bail bonds industry argued that this “financial
collateral is the only effective way to ensure defendants return to court for their
trial.”295 To test this argument, the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court instituted a risk assessment tool to test if the defendant released without cash bail
would be likely to return.296 Orleans Parish Criminal District Court used a risk
assessment tool developed by the Vera Institute that uses data on prior missed
court appearances, criminal history, age, and residency to predict a defendant’s
likelihood to fail to appear in court or be re-arrested during pretrial release.297
Before the institution of this system, the average jail stay for a low risk defendant was twelve days.298 After a few months, the average jail stay fell to two
days.299 Further, defendants returned to court at “roughly” the same rate as defendants in other jurisdictions.300
By using a risk assessment tool designed to separately evaluate both the
potential for failure to appear at subsequent court dates and new criminal arrests, judges are given more options when making pretrial decisions. The use of
a decision-making matrix like the DMF in conjunction with designated risk
scores allows judges to further know what pretrial conditions might be the least
restrictive outside of bail. Jurisdictions looking to implement risk assessment
tools can look to New Jersey’s use and roll out of the PSA with DMF for an
example of successful implementation. While New Jersey’s pretrial reforms are
FileKey=f9d452f6-ac5a-b8e7-5d68-0969abd2cc82&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/5Y3VFKQD].
291 N.J. JUDICIARY, supra note 289 at 5.
292 Id.
293 About
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PUB.
SAFETY
ASSESSMENT,
https://www.psapretrial.org/about#jurisdictions-united-states
[https://perma.cc/V24RWSBG] (last visited Apr. 24, 2019).
294 Id.
295 Avia Shen, New Orleans’ Great Bail Reform Experiment, CITY LAB (Oct. 19, 2017),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/10/new-orleanss-great-bail-reformexperiment/543396/ [https://perma.cc/7TT4-49KC].
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not without issue, the tool was a demonstrable step in the right direction towards integrating objective risk assessment factors with the judicial discretion
needed to make individualized decisions.
4. Bail Reform Where Commercial Bonds are Outlawed: The Illinois
Example
Even states without commercial bail bonds are looking to reform their pretrial practices to ensure justice for defendants.301 Illinois, Kentucky, Oregon,
and Wisconsin abolished commercial bail bonds and created a system of percentage bonds.302 So, rather than direct bail deposits to private business, these
states require bail deposits directly to the court.303 For example, in Illinois, depending on a defendant’s condition of release, state law requires defendants pay
10 percent or the full amount.304 The amount paid is set by a bail schedule for
most misdemeanor charges including traffic, ordinance, conservation, and petty
offenses.305 For a felony offense, judicial discretion dictates the amount of
bail.306 When making the bail-setting decision the judge considers: the nature
and circumstances of the offense charged, whether evidence shows use or threat
of violence, and thirty-five other statutorily defined factors.307 The majority of
Illinois courts use these factors combined with the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (VPRAI) to determine whether pretrial custody is necessary and the amount of bail that should be set.308
In 2003, the Virginia Department of Criminal Services developed the
VPRAI, a risk assessment tool, to assist judges in making pretrial release decisions.309 VPRAI is an automated computer program that uses nine factors, such
as the type of charge, any other pending charges, length at current residence,
and employment status, to determine a defendant’s risk level and then suggest
conditions for release.310 California and Virginia currently use the VPRAI
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tool.311 Under VPRAI, if a defendant receives a recommendation for bail and
they are unable to pay, they are given a second hearing within seven days to determine an adjusted or waiver of bail.312 If a defendant makes all of their court
appearances, the full bail amount, or their adjusted bail amount, is returned minus the cost of administrative fees.313 Moreover, “[i]f the defendant fails to
make all court appearances, a bond forfeiture hearing may be conducted.”314
Additionally, in 2016, Illinois collected data on pretrial services from a
quarter of its counties.315 In those counties, there were 15,390 new pretrial cases.316 Of those defendants released on bond, 1,248 had their bond revoked for
committing a new offense (33%), a rule violation (29%), or a failure to make a
court appearance (39%).317 After that data was collected, the Illinois legislature
passed the Illinois Bail Reform Act of 2017 (“the Act”).318 The Act sought to
push Illinois’s courts further away from the use of monetary bail.319 This Act
created a presumption that any condition of pretrial release would be the least
restrictive condition to assure the defendant’s appearance in court and nonmonetary in nature.320 These conditions of release “may include” but are not
limited to: electronic monitoring; curfews; drug counseling; stay-away orders;
and in person reporting.321
The Act also specifically addresses the amount of bail.322 A defendant’s
bail must assure compliance with conditions set in the bail bond, must not be
oppressive, and must be made in consideration of the defendant’s ability to
pay.323 The Act creates two categories of offenses: A and B.324 Category A offenses are class 1 and 2 felonies, as well as additional statutorily defined felonies.325 Category B offenses are qualified as petty offenses, business offenses,
class A, B, and C misdemeanors, and any class 3 or 4 felony not defined as a
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category A offense.326 Any defendant who is charged with a Category B offense and remains in custody because they are unable to financially secure their
release must be brought back before the court for a rehearing on the conditions
of their release.327 Accordingly, the amount of the bail is reduced by $30.00 for
every day incarcerated while awaiting a hearing.328 While more collected data
and research is required, in the wake of Illinois’ steps toward pretrial reform,
PJI did give them a “C” grade in their 2017 review of the state, which was
above the national average of “D.”329
As states across the country seek to eliminate the flaws of the classic bail
system, the major goals are equity and a just outcome for presumably innocent
defendants. As California seeks to completely eliminate cash bail through legislative efforts, other jurisdictions like New Jersey, Illinois, and Washington D.C.
have demonstrated that by generating more pretrial alternatives, cash bail can
cease to be the default and become the last resort option. Ultimately, California’s attempt at reform shows that the “quick fix,” statewide option does not
work. Instead, states should seek to involve stakeholders, research, and phase
into bail setting alternatives supported by data for judges to make their determinations.
C. Executive Driven Pretrial Reform
State executive branches across the country have also acted to reform pretrial practices and allocate funding to better service pretrial defendants.330 For
example, in 2015, Governor Tom Wolf of Pennsylvania requested support from
the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) and the
Pew Charitable Trust (Pew) to provide technical assistance with the state’s efforts of criminal justice reform.331 The initiative found that the state had inadequate pretrial and sentencing guidance.332 Further, the initiative showed the
state’s counties seldom used pretrial risk assessments and that black defendants
were far more likely than white defendants to receive a monetary bail decision.333 Following the findings of the initiative, a group of stakeholders, including bipartisan law makers, agency heads, and members of the judiciary, voted
to implement policy changes to correct these disparities.334 In 2019, the Gover326
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nor announced that following this focus on criminal justice reform, Pennsylvania prison populations experienced the largest decrease in 40 years.335 Most recently, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo proposed regulatory revisions to
New York’s Bail bond industry.336 This regulatory review is intended to eliminate predatory practices in the industry by standardizing bail bond contracts,
fees, and documents involved in bail transactions.337 These measures are meant
to provide consumer protection and to “raise the standards of integrity in the
bail business.”338
D. Judiciary Driven Pretrial Reform
Another driving force behind pretrial reform are judiciaries across the
country.339 Some state judiciaries have written explicit recommendations,340 established blue ribbon commissions,341 and formed specific committees342 to
look into pretrial release practices. To illustrate, legal stakeholders in Illinois
petitioned the State Supreme Court to adopt a statewide rule to protect indigent
defendants from pretrial detention when they have an inability to pay.343 This
group included eighty-seven attorneys, prosecutors, judges, and law professors.344 The group highlighted how cash bail had strong evidence of wealth and
race-based discrimination: “Seventy-three percent of people detained in the
Cook County jail are African-American, and Black defendants on average receive higher bail amounts . . . .”345 These stakeholders urged their Supreme
Court to act “as soon as possible.”346 Moreover, in Orange and Oscelos counties in Florida, prosecutors are limiting the offenses they seek bail for, calling
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bail a “poverty penalty.”347 Charges that prosecutors will no longer seek bail
for include: driving without a license or vehicle registration; disorderly intoxication; panhandling; loitering; and low-level drug crimes, like possession of
drug paraphernalia.348 This stakeholder led change can be very effective and
involve minimal disruption to current court programs.
Jurisdictions looking to reform their pretrial practices should follow the
successful examples arising from executive and judicial driven reform. By creating a dialogue about the issues associated with pretrial proceedings and bail,
stakeholders are finding ways to improve their jurisdiction’s systems. Executive driven reform seemingly works best when trying to develop data and regulate the commercial bond industry. Judicial efforts help to create a dialogue and
allow both prosecutors and defense attorneys to present their recommendations
without disrupting current practices.
III. CONCERNS REGARDING COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL COURT TOOLS USED TO
SET BAIL AND REFORM PRETRIAL SYSTEMS
With jails being the front door to incarceration, one of the earliest and most
important opportunities for the exercise of judicial discretion presents itself
during the bail assessment process.349 As states make strides in pretrial reform
and create alternatives to their current bail setting practices, it is important to
note major concerns surrounding popular tools used to guide—or possibly disrupt—judicial discretion, including bail schedules and pretrial risk assessments.
A. Constitutionality of Bail Schedules
On September 3, 2015, the Calhoun Police Department of Georgia arrested
Maurice Walker, a 54-year old African American man, on the charge of “pedestrian under the influence” for allegedly drunkenly walking down a stretch of
highway.350 At the time of his arrest, police informed Mr. Walker that he would
remain incarcerated unless he paid the $160 fixed cash bond set by the City of
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Calhoun’s bail schedule for the misdemeanor charge he incurred.351 Due to his
inability to pay, Mr. Walker remained confined to the Gordon County Jail for
six days.352 Mr. Walker’s release was triggered by a lawsuit filed by the Southern Center for Human Rights (SCHR).353 The central issue in the case was
“whether a city can detain indigent people accused of misdemeanors for up to
seven days without any inquiry into their ability to pay bail” creating a bail system that violated the Fourteenth Amendment.354 Importantly, Mr. Walker’s
case highlights an important aspect of the cash bail debate—the court’s use of
and reliance on bail schedules in its bail determinations.355
351
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prohibiting the city from holding anyone charged with a misdemeanor until its “post-arrest
procedures” complied with the U.S. Constitution. Id. The City of Calhoun appealed to the
11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Walker v. City of Calhoun, CONST. ACCOUNTABILITY
CTR.,
https://www.theusconstitution.org/litigation/walker-v-city-of-calhoun/
[https://perma.cc/WHF8-7UWH] (last visited Mar. 4, 2019). In a 2-1 decision, the 11th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Calhoun’s revised bail system stating that:
352

Walker and other indigents suffer no ‘absolute deprivation’ of the benefit they seek, namely pretrial release. Rather, they must merely wait some appropriate amount of time to receive the same
benefit as the more affluent. Indeed, after such delay, they arguably receive preferential treatment, in at least one respect, by being released on recognizance without having to provide any
security.

Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2018). Moreover, the court
concluded that under Supreme Court precedent “indigency determinations for purposes of
setting bail are presumptively constitutional if made within 48 hours of arrest.” Id. at 1266.
Despite the 11th Circuit’s ruling, Walker’s case fell right into a hot debate about the criminal
justice system: should people with money be able to buy their freedom when people without
money must wait behind bars? Moreover, the Walker case illustrates how dependence on
cash bail has created a two-tiered criminal justice system in the majority of states across the
country. Wykstra, supra note 44.The disparities created by the cash bail system are particularly recognizable amongst low-income people of color. Rabuy & Kapf, supra note 163; see
also JESSICA EAGLIN AND DANYELLE SOLOMON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, REDUCING
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN JAILS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LOCAL PRACTICE 20
(2015),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Racial%20Disparities%20Repo
rt%20062515.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC5P-VGPP]. Notably, in its decision, the 11th Circuit
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“[B]ail schedules are procedural schemes that provide judges with standardized money bail amounts based upon the offense charged, regardless of the
characteristics of an individual defendant.”356 The tool’s use and a court’s reliance on the tool varies; a poll by the Pretrial Justice Institute revealed that approximately 64 percent of poll participants stated that their jurisdiction used a
bail schedule to determine bail or supplement its bail setting practices.357 Proponents argue that “pre-set bonds are constitutional and provide a guarantee
that the accused will come to court appointments.”358 Moreover, they assert that
the tool’s use ensures public safety by creating categories of serious offenses
that allow the court to hold defendants without bail.359
On the other hand, criminal justice reform advocates argue the tool is unconstitutional because there is no mechanism within it that determines whether
a defendant is indigent.360 Specifically, opponents assert that “fee structures
place an undue burden on indigent defendants, who may have more difficulty
paying bail, including relatively low bail fees associated with misdemeanor offenses, than non-indigents defendants accused of similar offenses.”361 As a result, an unintentional result of a court’s use of a bail schedules is “the unnecessary detention of misdemeanants, indigents, and non-dangerous defendants”
because they cannot afford to pay a predetermined bail amount.362 As discussed
earlier, the unintentional and unnecessary detention of a defendant has serious
collateral costs, including family separation, unemployment, and loss of ties to
their community.363
Judicial discretion is an important facet of a fair and equitable criminal justice system.364 The concern with the use of bail schedules at this stage is that
the tool can “represent an improper and ill-advised, if not illegal, substitute for
judicial discretion at bail” and “encourage[s] an automated approach to pretrial
release decision-making by compelling reliance upon a single fixed bail condition—money—found in a predetermined schedule based solely on the defendant’s highest charge.”365 Thus, the use of a bail schedule—particularly in jurisstates that individuals behind bars simply charged for misdemeanors “must merely wait
some appropriate amount of time to receive the same benefit as the more affluent.” Walker,
901 F.3d at 1262. What is an appropriate amount of time? Across the country, people simply
charged for a crime wait months, even years. Wykstra, supra note 44.
356 Carlson, supra note 349.
357 Id.
358 Cook, supra note 350.
359 Alison M. Smith, State Money-Bail Systems: Differing Approaches, CONGR. RES. SERV.
1, 2 (Nov. 27, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10220.pdf [https://perma.cc/48NVJTFW].
360 Cook, supra note 350.
361 Smith, supra note 359.
362 Carlson, supra note 349.
363 Id.; see discussion supra Part I.
364 Carlson, supra note 349.
365 Id.
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dictions that only use a bail schedule to determine bail—may reduce a judge’s
consideration of statutorily enumerated factors to provide for a balance of a
person’s “liberty interest against public safety and court integrity concerns.”366
As a result of these concerns, various jurisdictions have considered or are currently considering the constitutionality of bail schedules.367
B. The Problem with Pretrial Risk Assessments
Jurisdictions are increasingly turning to risk assessment instruments to address issues associated with the money bail systems during the pretrial release
and bail setting process.368 These tools are said to provide judges with a scientific model for predicting the risk of whether a defendant will fail to appear for
trial or commit crime during the pretrial period.369 Though advocates of risk
assessments acknowledge such a tool may not account for the totality of a given defendant’s situation, they argue that when used in conjunction with professional judgment, the tool is an improvement over professional judgment
alone.370
A court may use a risk assessment instrument in a variety of circumstances,
including in the pretrial context to gauge the risk an individual has of failing to
appear for court proceedings or being arrested while awaiting trial.371 These
risk assessments tools are developed by analyzing large numbers of cases to
identify factors that strongly correlate with the action that a court’s risk assessment tool is intended to predict.372 Once a risk assessment tool is developed, it
is then used to measure and score risk factors to produce a defendant’s risk
score.373 Factors measured in a risk assessment tools may include marital history, residence history, and employment status.374 However, critics argue that
such factors may serve as “proxies” for minority status and poverty.375 Since
these factors are not related to an individual’s blameworthiness and may be
outside of the individual’s control, they are particularly objectionable.376
Though these factors may correlate with increased risk, they also have a disparate impact on minority and impoverished populations.
366

Id.
Id.; see, e.g., Pelekai v. White, 861 P.2d 1205 (Haw. 1993); Clark v. Hall, 53 P.3d 416
(Okla. Crim. App. 2002); see also discussion supra Section II.B.i.
368 MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 10, at 19.
369 Id. at 5.
370 Erin Harbinson, Understanding Risk Assessment Tools, 75 BENCH & B. MINN. 14, 16–17
(2018).
371 MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 10, at 18.
372 Harbinson, supra note 370, at 15.
373 Jennifer L. Skeem & Christopher Lowenkamp, Risk, Race, and Recidivism: Predictive
Bias and Disparate Impact, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 680, 682 (2016).
374 Id. at 681.
375 MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 10, at 22.
376 Id. at 9.
367
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While risk assessment tools are created using scientific methods, a growing
concern is that the tool is using faulty data to produce skewed outcomes because criminal justice data is known to be unreliable.377 Accordingly, critics of
risk assessment instruments assert that the current use of such tools perpetuates
the very biases and disparities that the cash bail system already has in place.378
By relying on biased data to create the tools, taking into consideration factors
that serve as proxies for minority status and poverty, and then applying such
tools in a biased manner, the cycle of discrimination continues.379 Thus, those
marginalized by the cash bail system are still marginalized under the nonmonetary pretrial release and bail setting process in jurisdictions that employ risk assessment tools.380
Moreover, even if the data used to create risk assessment tools and its factors are objective, there is still a possibility of bias in the application of the
tools. There is a possibility that those who carry out the assessments may, at
worst, manipulate the results, and, at best, have varied perspectives that negatively impact certain vulnerable populations.381 Furthermore, judges and other
decision makers in the criminal justice system may vary in when and how they
choose to use a risk assessment and its’ results in their judgments.382 Consequently, even if the tools are found to be objective, when they are not used in
an objective manner, marginalized communities remain stuck in the margins.
Although risk assessment tools may replace arbitrary or discriminatory decision-making in the pretrial release and bail setting process with a more systematic method grounded in evidence, they also have the power to disparately
impact communities of color.383 In the context of actuarial risk assessment in
the sentencing context, former Attorney General Eric Holder stated that, “[b]y
377

Id. at 22.
See Julia Angwin and Jeff Larson, Bias in Criminal Risk Scores is Mathematically Inevitable,
Researchers
Say,
PROPUBLICA
(Dec.
30,
2016,
4:44
PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/bias-in-criminal-risk-scores-is-mathematically-inevitableresearchers-say [https://perma.cc/8CR2-2UXF]; Jennifer L. Doleac & Megan Stevenson, Are
Criminal Risk Assessment Scores Racist?, BROOKINGS (Aug. 22, 2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2016/08/22/are-criminal-risk-assessment-scoresracist/ [https://perma.cc/AWU4-TBMG]; George Joseph, Justice by Algorithm, CITYLAB
(Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2016/12/justice-by-algorithm/505514/
[https://perma.cc/BJ8C-UX4W]; discussion supra Section II.B.i.
379 See Matt Watkins, The Most Hot-Button Issue in Criminal Justice Reform?, CTR. FOR CT.
INNOVATION (Oct. 2018), https://www.courtinnovation.org/publications/risk-assessmentpodcast [https://perma.cc/AY55-H6LU]; see, e.g., Michael Tonry, Legal and Ethical Issues
in the Prediction of Recidivism, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 167, 173 (2014) (concluding that reliance on criminal histories intertwined with socioeconomic factors, such as age at time of
first arrest, custody status at time of first arrest, and total number of convictions, inherently
disadvantage minority defendants).
380 See id.; discussion supra Section II.B.i.
381 Sonja B. Starr, Risk Assessment Era: An Overdue Debate, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 205, 206
(2015).
382 Id.
383 MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 10, at 22.
378
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basing sentencing decisions on static factors and immutable characteristics—
like the defendant’s education level, socioeconomic background, or neighborhood—they may exacerbate unwarranted and unjust disparities that are already
far too common in our criminal justice system and in our society.”384 Accordingly, risk assessment tools may not fix the biases and disparities inherit in the
cash bail system, but rather they may make existing racial and socioeconomic
disparities even worse by giving scientific credibility to unequal outcomes.385
In her article “Assessing Risk Assessment in Action,” Professor Megan
Stevenson identified problems with using a risk assessment tool to accomplish
goals in pretrial decisions.386 The problems included: the imperfect methods of
measuring human predictions, the “implausible assumption that the human’s
objective” is the same as the algorithm’s, and an inability to measure accuracy
because of the many variables within individual outcomes.387 The problems
highlight how data based on algorithmic versus judges’ results can be skewed
and depend on subjective goals.388 For example, if a judge sets bail, a defendant
who cannot pay merely goes to jail and is then lost as a data point in determining if the algorithm would have accurately predicted the result.389 Professor
Stevenson highlighted that testing algorithmic assessments is not like a race,
with a clear winner.390 Ideally, the best alternative to algorithmic risk assessments would be to test the predictions of a human versus the prediction made
by the algorithm.391 This failure to account for the “human” element of a desired outcome can cause statistical issues.
Many jurisdictions today are looking to fix the racial biases and disparities
in the cash bail system, though the tools being used to fix such problems may
not only continue the problems, but make them worse.392 Turning from arbitrary decision-making that marginalizes minority and impoverished communities to tools supported by flawed science is not the way to fix disparities in the
pretrial release and bail setting process.393 Ultimately, more research is necessary to determine the tool’s effectiveness and whether its use further perpetuates the biases and disparities at the center of our country’s broken criminal justice system.
384

Atty. Gen. Eric Holder, Address at National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
57th
Annual
Meeting
(Aug.
1,
2014),
available
at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-nationalassociation-criminal-defense-lawyers-57th [https://perma.cc/8H27-4HK9].
385 MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 10, at 22.
386 Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINNESOTA L. REV. 303,
324 (2018).
387 Id. at 324–25.
388 Id. at 323.
389 Id.
390 Id. at 322.
391 Id.
392 MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 10, at 22.
393 Watkins, supra note 379.
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IV. NEVADA
“In Nevada, the criminal justice system has too often not been a system of corrections so much as a system of incarceration, without doing much . . . to correct the drivers of criminal behavior. Instead of trying to solve the problem, the
approach has more often been to warehouse an offender—out of sight, out of
mind.”394
Notwithstanding a strong bipartisan movement at all levels to undo mass
incarceration, the United States continues to have the highest incarceration rate
and overall number of people incarcerated in the world.395 Nonetheless, by the
end of 2016, the United States reached the lowest incarceration rate in the last
two decades.396 This decrease, however, is not reflected in state incarceration
rates, as demonstrated by the expansion of Nevada’s carceral state.397 Despite
the 7 percent decrease in the national rate of incarceration, Nevada’s incarceration rate suffered from a 7 percent increase.398 Moreover, Nevada incarcerates
more people on average than other states,399 resulting in an “imprisonment rate
that is 15 percent higher than the national average.”400 The incarceration rate
forces the state to house nearly 200 inmates in an Arizona prison.401 In the past
decade, the state female imprisonment rate generated specific concerns because

394

Hearing on Assemb. B. 236 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 2019 Leg., 80th
Sess. (Nev. 2019) (Statement of Steve Yeager, Chair, Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary),
http://nvleg.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_id=11041 [https://perma.cc/J4PL-MNDZ].
395 The US “incarcerates a larger share of its population than any other country.” John
Gramlich, America’s Incarceration Rate is at a Two-Decade Low, PEW RES. CTR. (May 2,
2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/02/americas-incarceration-rate-is-at-atwo-decade-low/ [https://perma.cc/L4XN-YRZ4]; see discussion Section I.
396 Id. “At the end of 2016, there were about 2.2 million people behind bars in the U.S., including 1.5 million under the jurisdiction of federal and state prisons and roughly 741,000 in
the custody of locally run jails.” Id. The sharp decrease in the incarceration rate, which accounts for the population change, is accompanied by the decrease in the number of inmates
in recent years. Id.
397 Lucas Thomas, Nevada’s Incarceration Rate Among Highest In The Country,
PATCH.COM (Jan. 18, 2018, 5:44 PM), https://patch.com/nevada/lasvegas/nevadasincarceration-rate-among-highest-country [https://perma.cc/QE67-MBFD]. Importantly, of
the over 1.5 million people behind bars, the states incarcerated 1,316,205 people (87.4% of
the number of incarcerated people in the US), whereas the federal system only incarcerated
189,192 people (12.6% of the number of incarcerated people in the US). Id.
398 Michael Lyle, Criminal Justice Reform Long Overdue in Nevada, Ford Says, NEV.
CURRENT (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.nevadacurrent.com/2018/11/12/criminal-justicereform-long-overdue-in-nevada-ford-says/ [https://perma.cc/N974-9ZE2].
399 Michelle Rindels, Can Better Data Help Keep Prison Population Down? Nevada’s Going
to
Try,
NEV.
INDEPENDENT
(Aug.
12,
2018,
2:05
AM),
https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/can-better-data-help-keep-prison-populationdown-nevadas-going-to-try [https://perma.cc/C4XU-8K9M].
400 Id.; see also JRI FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 4.
401 Rindels, supra note 399.
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it has grown at “four times the pace of the overall prison population.”402 Overall, these notable areas of growth will contribute to 15 percent of the overall
growth of the incarcerated population over the next decade.403 Over the next ten
years, Nevada’s incarcerated population is expected to grow by 1,197 beds.404
That growth is “estimated to cost the state an additional $770 million in capital
expenditures to build or lease new prisons and added operating costs.”405 Thus,
while many states have seen significant decreases in incarcerated populations,
crimes rates, and costs, Nevada has not—and will not—follow suit without significant criminal justice reform.
In 2018, the substantial costs attached to the growing incarcerated population in Nevada raised concerns because of the 20 percent increase in yearly
spending since 2012, and the sharp increase in correctional officer overtime
costs, “prompting the state to dip into reserves and eating up money that’s
meant to be available to a variety of agencies.”406 In response, former Governor
Brian Sandoval announced a comprehensive review of Nevada’s criminal justice system in partnership with the Crime and Justice Institute (CJI).407 In January 2019, the Advisory Commission on the Administrative of Justice (ACAJ)
released its final report which connected the bulk of the growth in Nevada’s
correctional facilities to the rise in the number of individuals incarcerated for
probation and parole violations, and the at least two-thirds of the population
that entered the system for a nonviolent offense.408 Overall, the alarming
growth of Nevada’s incarcerated population increased the annual corrections
budget “14 percent in the last decade, reaching $347 million in the current fiscal year.”409 As a result of their key findings, the ACAJ included twenty-five
policy recommendations “specifically designed to improve public safety by
holding offenders accountable, reducing recidivism, and increasing the resources available to combat the state’s behavioral health crisis” and control
population growth and corrections costs for consideration by the Nevada Legislature.410 Noticeably absent from the ACAJ’s recommendations and proposed
402

JRI FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 4. KNPR News Staff, Report: Nevada Prison Population Above Average and Growing, NEV. PUBLIC RADIO (Sept. 13, 2018),
https://knpr.org/headline/2018-09/report-nevada-prison-population-above-average-andgrowing [https://perma.cc/SKR4-N6FH].
403 JRI FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 4.
404 Id.
405 Id.
406 Rindels, supra note 399.
407 Id.; see also Kinner, supra note 1.
408 Yeager, supra note 2.
409 Id.
410 The 25 policy recommendations provided by the ACAJ are:
1. Establish [crisis intervention training] requirements for law enforcement officers . . . .
2. Establish pre-prosecution diversion for first-time nonviolent felony offenders . . . .
3. Remove existing barriers to presumptive probations . . . .
4. Establish a presumption of sentence deferral for certain nonviolent offenders admitted to Specialty Court . . . .
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legislation are any changes specifically relating to bail and preventative detention, despite these issues being at the center of criminal justice reform conversations in Nevada in recent years.411
A. Nevada’s Cash Bail System
Nevada’s cash bail system is defined by some of the most detailed and
comprehensive statutes in the country, which are primarily based on the basic
principles of the commercial bail industry.412 Similar to the Eighth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution,413 the Nevada Constitution prohibits excessive bail.414
Specifically, the state’s constitution provides that “[a]ll persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties; unless for Capital Offenses or murders punishable by
life imprisonment without possibility of parole when the proof is evident or the

5. Ensure Drug and Mental Health Court programs align with best practices . . . .
6. Amend the burglary statute to correspond to different levels of conduct and create proportional penalties . . . .
7. Increase the felony theft threshold, establish different sentencing tiers for high-level larcenies,
and ensure theft threshold amounts are consistent across all related offenses . . . .
8. Reclassify simple possession of a controlled substance . . . .
9. Increase judicial discretion in sentencing for commercial drug offenses . . . .
10. Amend trafficking weights to distinguish drug sellers from drug traffickers, and require evidence of intent to sell or manufacture . . . .
11. Establish a lookback period for the habitual criminal statute . . . .
12. Remove the sentencing recommendation from the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report . . . .
13. Reclassify certain nonviolent Category B offenses to tailor criminal conduct more appropriately to the corresponding penalty . . . .
14. Establish and codify a streamlined parole process . . . .
15. Implement a specialty parole option for long-term, geriatric inmates . . . .
16. Reduce the maximum probation period that can be ordered . . . .
17. Expand the use of swift, certain, and proportional sanctions . . . .
18. Limit the period of incarceration resulting from a revocation for technical violations . . . .
19. Strengthen supervision decision-making . . . .
20. Expanding and systemizing reentry . . . .
21. Establish policies and practices to guide decision-making that address gender specific needs
....
22. Ensure sustainability of policy changes and adherence to best practices . . . .
23. Require a certain percentage of funds be dedicated to expanding the options available to law
enforcement when responding to individuals with behavioral health needs . . . .
24. Reinvest in community supervision, treatment, and transitional housing . . . . and
25. Reinvest in victims’ services . . . .

JRI FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 5, 21–36; Kinner, supra note 1.
411 See discussion infra Part IV.
412 Hayley E. Miller, Note, Taming the Wild West: Using Unsecured Bail Bonds in Nevada’s
Pretrial-Release Program, 16 NEV. L.J. 1239, 1245–46 (2016).
413 U.S. Const. amend. VIII; see also Kaczmarek v. State, 91 P.3d 16, 33–34 (Nev. 2004).
414 NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
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presumption great.”415 Thus, a defendant has the right to reasonable bail, except
when charged with capital murder or murders punishable by life in prison.416
In addition to constitutional provisions, Nevada statutes give the courts the
authority, in certain circumstances, to release an accused person pending trial
or sentencing.417 Statutory limitations exist under Nevada law regarding the
right to bail before conviction.418 Before the release of “a person arrested for
any crime, the court may impose such reasonable conditions on the person as it
deems necessary to protect the health, safety and welfare of the community and
to ensure that the person will appear at all times and places ordered by the
court.”419 Moreover, NRS § 178.4853 requires the court to consider a number
of factors in determining whether pretrial release without bail may be warranted, which include:
1. The length of residence in the community;
2. The status and history of employment;
3. Relationships with the person’s spouse and children, parents or other family
members and with close friends;
4. Reputation, character and mental condition;
5. Prior criminal record, including, without limitation, any record of appearing
or failing to appear after release on bail or without bail;
6. The identity or responsible members of the community who would vouch for
the reliability of the person;
7. The nature of the offense with which the person is charged, the apparent
probability of conviction and the likely sentence, insofar as these factors relate
to the risk of not appearing;
8. The nature and seriousness of the danger to the alleged victim, any other person or the community that would be posed by the person’s release;
9. The likelihood of more criminal activity by the person after release; and
10. Any other factors concerning the person’s ties to the community or bearing
on the risk that the person may willfully fail to appear.420

Moreover, Nevada statutes provide a non-comprehensive list of the conditions a judge may impose on the defendant, such as requiring the defendant to
remain in Nevada or within a particular county, prohibiting the defendant from
contact with specific people, prohibiting the defendant from entering a particular area (e.g., the Las Vegas strip) and from engaging in conduct that “may be
harmful to the person’s own health, safety or welfare, or the health, safety or
welfare of another person.”421 Ultimately, the decision to increase or lower bail
and impose conditions on pretrial release lies within the discretion of the court,
whose primary concerns are to protect the public health, safety and welfare, and
415
416
417
418
419
420
421

NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
Id.
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 178.4851, 178.4853 (2019).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.484 (2019).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.484(11) (2019).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.4853.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.484(11)(d).

3 NEV. L.J. FORUM 9

Spring 2019]

5/7/2019 10:51 AM

TO BAIL OR NOT TO BAIL

57

ensure a person’s return to court as mandated by a judge.422 For example, Nevada’s Second Judicial District Court, which serves Washoe County, supplements the statutory provision with fourteen conditions on release a judge can
impose.423 Whereas, the state’s Eighth Judicial District Court, which serves
Clark County and is home to Nevada’s largest metropolitan city, Las Vegas,
does not provide additional guidance to judges in this area.424 Despite statutory
guidance for setting bail and conditions on release, counties across the state
have adopted other tools including bail schedules and pretrial risk assessments
to allow for, at the very least, uniform bail setting practices at the county level.
1. Bail Schedules
Some of Nevada’s counties join the nearly 64 percent of counties across
the United States that use bail schedules.425 However, the use of these schedules causes bail regimes to vastly differ throughout the state. For example, in
Clark County, the Las Vegas Justice Court has implemented a bail schedule
which provides standardized bail amounts for various categories of felony offenses, gross misdemeanors, misdemeanors, and violations of protective orders.426 Nevada statutes also impose additional bail for crime enhancements,
which include:427
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

422

“Felony committed on property of school, at activity sponsored by
school or on school bus;”428
“Felony committed by adult with assistance of child;”429
“Use of handgun with metal-penetrating bullet in [the] commission of
crime;”430
“Use of deadly weapon or tear gas in commission of crime;”431
“Felony committed in violation of order for protection or order to restrict conduct;”432

NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.484(11).
CRIM. R. PRAC. SECOND JUD. CT. ST. NEV. 5.
424 See R. PRAC. EIGHTH JUD. CT. ST. NEV.
425 Carlson, supra note 349.
426 JUSTICE
COURT, LAS VEGAS TWP., STANDARD BAIL SCHEDULE, (2015),
https://www.clarkcountybar.org/wp-content/uploads/lvjcsbs15.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7ZLLXT4] [hereinafter STANDARD BAIL SCHEDULE]. For an Example of Clark County’s Bail
Schedule see Appendix, tbl.A.8.
427 Id.; see also NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 193.161 (school property), 193.162 (assistance of
child), 193.163 (handgun containing metal-penetrating bullets), 193.165 (use of deadly
weapon), 193.166 (felony in violation of protection order), 193.167 (60 or older/vulnerable
person), 193.1675 (characteristics of victim), 193.168 (gang), 193.1685 (terrorism),
453.3335, 453.3345, 453.3351, or 453.3353 (certain violations involving controlled substances under certain circumstances).
428 NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.161.
429 NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.162.
430 NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.163.
431 NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.165.
432 NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.166.
423
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6.

“Certain crimes committed against person 60 years of age or older or
against vulnerable person;”433
7. “Commission of a crime because of certain actual or perceived characteristics of victim;”434
8. “Felony committed to promote activities of criminal gang;”435
9. “Felony committed with intent to commit, cause, aid, further or conceal act of terrorism”;436
10. Certain violations involving “controlled substances under certain circumstances”437

While any person in Nevada charged with the aforementioned is subject to
additional penalties pursuant to Nevada law, the Las Vegas Township Justice
Court standard bail schedule provides that when the listed enhancements are
added to a charged offense, the standard bail amount doubles.438
Clark County’s bail schedule differs significantly from the bail schedule
implemented in Churchill County, which is one of the state’s fifteen rural counties. The Churchill County bail schedule provides standardized bail amounts for
over one hundred violations, including traffic violations, with bail ranging from
$25.00 for “position of driver’s hands” to $250,000 for “sexual assault—
(Forcible/Substantial Bodily Harm).”439 Previously, the Second Judicial District
Court used a bail schedule to set bail for those arrested in Washoe County, Nevada.440 However, when the County became part of the Pretrial Risk Assessment Tool Pilot Program, its use was suspended.441
As demonstrated, the possible bail amount a defendant will pay is contingent on where in the state the charged offense is committed. Without a bail
schedule to rely on, judges may use their discretion, as authorized under Nevada law, to determine the appropriate amount to assign to a defendant. Because
of the concern that the lack of uniformity in setting bail resulted in various outcomes and notable disparities, Nevada implemented an evidence-based release
system using a pretrial risk assessment tool to create an avenue for more consistent bail setting practices throughout the state.
433
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(2013),
http://www.churchillcounty.org/documentcenter/view/3022
[https://perma.cc/HEU2LCMT].
440 Pretrial Services —Assessment Program, SECOND JUD. DIST. CT. (June 18, 2018),
https://www.washoecourts.com/OtherDocs/PretrialServices/SJDC%20OnePage%20Program%20Overview%20-%20Pretrial%20Services%20Assessment%20%20June%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FLR-NQBY].
441 See Admin. Order 2016-15, In re Admin. Matter of Rescinding Washoe Cty. Unif. Bail
Schedule (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.washoecourts.com/AdminOrders/PDF/2016/201615%20ADMINISTRATIVE%20MATTER%20OF%20RESCINDING%20WASHOE%20C
OUNTY%20UNIFORM%20BAIL%20SCHEDULE.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BDY-LC77].
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2. Nevada’s Pretrial Risk Assessment Tool
In 2015, in response to the concern surrounding the inconsistency in the
state’s bail setting practices, Justice James W. Hardesty of the Supreme Court
of Nevada convened a committee to study and explore alternatives and improvements to Nevada’s pretrial release system.442 Over several meetings, the
Committee to Study Evidence Based Pretrial Release was informed about various pretrial assessment tools used in jurisdictions across the country including
the Ohio Risk Assessment System (ORAS).443 After review of the tools presented and its own research, the Committee decided it would customize a pretrial risk tool incorporating “all of the positive attributes” of the instruments reviewed.444 In February 2016, the Committee presented a prototype tool called
the Nevada Pretrial Risk (NPR) instrument.445 After taking constructive recommendations from Committee members, the NPR tool’s initial set of risk factors included the following:
1. Existing pending criminal case at time of current offense;
2. Age at first arrest (adult or juvenile);
3. Prior misdemeanor arrests;
4. Prior felony or gross misdemeanor arrests;
5. Prior arrest for violent crimes;
6. Prior FTA’s past two years;
7. Current employment status;
8. Current residency; and,
9. Indications of substance abuse.446

“The weights for each of the nine scoring items and the overall risk scale
were based on prior studies of other similar risk instruments,” specifically
ORAS, with the expectation that modifications to the weight and scale for factors would happen after data collection and analysis.447 By the end of the
month, the tool was ready to be tested on a random sample of defendants released in 2014 from the Washoe County Detention Facility, all defendants released in White Pine County, and two random samples of defendants from the
Clark County Detention Center or the Las Vegas City Jail.448
The Committee assigned five primary goals for the NPR’s pilot test:
1. Description of the types of people currently being released in pretrial status in
terms of their demographics, offense, and criminal history;
2. The methods of release and time in custody prior to release;
3. Re-arrest and Failure to Appear (FTA) rates;
4. Testing of the prototype instrument in terms of its validity; and,
442
443
444
445
446
447
448

AUSTIN & ALLEN, supra note 5, at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1–2.
Id.
Id.

3 NEV. L.J. FORUM 9

60

5/7/2019 10:51 AM

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL FORUM

[Vol. 3:9

5. Methods for improving the NPR predictive qualities.449

Two key dependent variables were recorded on a total of 1,057 collected
from the four jurisdictions: (1) “whether the released defendant was rearrested
for a new crime” and (2) “whether there was a bench warrant issued for failing
to appear . . . for any scheduled court hearing.”450 These two variables determined “if the scoring items that were contained on the proto-type NPR instrument were statistically associated with either the rate of re-arrest or [failure to
appear].”451 Throughout testing, the prototype tool was adjusted as follows:
1. Added the factor of possession of valid cell phone number . . . ;
2. Consolidated the substance abuse factor by only using prior drug/alcohol related arrests . . . ;
3. Modified the residence factor by adding whether the person was a resident of
Nevada . . . ;
4. Consolidated prior misdemeanor arrest score so that 3 or more receive 2
points . . . ;
5. Consolidated prior felony/gross misdemeanor arrests score so that 2 or more
are scored as 2 points . . . ; and,
6. Re-calibrated the overall scale so that it matches the new scoring process. 452

Based on the results of the pilot test, it was determined that the prototype
was “proven to be a statistically valid pretrial risk instrument that meets industry standards in terms of the factors being used and their overall predictive accuracy” and ready to be fully implemented in the sampled jurisdictions.453 Subsequently, the Committee produced two additional versions of the tool where it
changed several items from the 2016 version, one tested in Washoe County and
White Pine, and the other in Clark County.454 These changes included rescaling
risk factors, adjusting point assignments for certain factors, and adding mitigating verified stability factors.455
Approximately a year following the implementation of the NPR in four jurisdictions in Nevada, the Pretrial Justice Institute published, “The State of Pretrial Justice in America” in November 2017.456 The report was a comprehensive
study of pretrial systems across the country, including a review of whether the

449
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454 See Committee to Study Evidence-Based Pretrial Release Meeting Recordings, SUP. CT.
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(July
19,
2017),
available
at
https://nvcourts.gov/AOC/Committees_and_Commissions/Evidence/Meeting_Recordings/
[https://perma.cc/A7EB-GDBZ] [hereinafter Committee to Study Evidence-Based Pretrial
Release].
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NPR was producing positive results.457 To arrive at the grade, the report’s analysis focused on three measures:458
1. Rate of unconvicted people in local jails;
2. Percentage of people living in a jurisdiction that uses evidence-based pretrial
assessment to inform pretrial decisions, and
3. Percent of a state’s population living in a jurisdiction that has functionally
eliminated secured money bail.

The report indicates that Nevada has a pretrial detention rate (rate of unconvicted people in local jails) of 17.9 per 10,000 residents.459 Moreover,
89.1% percent of people live in a county that uses the NPR.460 An analysis of
the three measures resulted in Nevada being one of nine states to receive a “B”
grade.461 This result suggests that, at least in the jurisdictions using the NPR,
Nevada seemingly took a step in the right direction to improve its pretrial system. Since its implementation in 2016, the four selected jurisdictions continue
to use and collect data from the use of the modified NPR to provide a follow-up
report at the end of 2019.462
In the end, regardless of the process or tool used to set bail, a defendant
who can afford bail pays cash or credit to the court, an amount that is later returned to the defendant provided they appear in court.463 In the case that a defendant cannot pay, a bail-bond company may post bail and assure the court
that the defendant will appear.464 Pursuant to NRS 697.300, bail bondsmen
must charge either “15 percent of the amount of the of bond or $50, whichever
is greater,” plus administrative fees.465 Typically, the defendant provides cosigners and collateral to cover the liability of a failure to appear.466 Release
from preventative detention occurs once the bond posts and is later returned to
the company provided the defendant appears in court as assured by the bond.467
B. An Examination of Recent Bail Reform Efforts in Nevada
In comparison to the majority of states, Nevada has been slow to join the
criminal justice reform movement. The first significant step occurred in 2015,
when Justice Hardesty led the “Committee to Study Evidence Based Pretrial
457
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461 Id. at 12–13. Notably, California received a “D.” Id.
462 See generally Committee to Study Evidence-Based Pretrial Release, supra note 454.
463 NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.502(2)(b) (2019).
464 See F. Andre Taylor, Bail Bondsmen Sometimes Get Bad Rap, LAS VEGAS REV. J. (July
15, 2014, 3:00 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/life/public-safety/bail-bondsmensometimes-get-bad-rap [https://perma.cc/QR2F-EG8J].
465 NEV. REV. STAT. § 697.300(1)(a) (2019).
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Release,” as discussed above, to examine alternatives to the state’s varying bail
setting practices.468 In the years following, the state has seen other efforts to reform pretrial services as it pertains to preventative detention and cash bail.
1. 2017 Legislative Efforts: Nevada’s “Elimination of Cash Bail” Bill
During the 2017 Legislative Session, state legislators introduced bills to
address the deficiencies of the state’s criminal justice system.469 Among those
was Assembly Bill 136 (AB 136), introduced by Assemblywoman Dina Neal,
which would have mandated a court to consider the imposition of “nonfinancial conditions . . . on a person to mitigate the risk of failure to appear or
the risk to public safety.”470 Additionally, the bill “authorized the court to use
an evidence-based risk assessment tool in deciding whether there is good cause
to release a person without bail.”471 However, Gov. Sandoval vetoed Assemblywoman Neal’s bill stating it would “incorporate a new and unproven method
for determining whether a criminal defendant should be released from custody
without posting bail.”472 Assemblywoman Neal’s bill was a significant step in
Nevada’s efforts to fight the money bail system, despite its demise on the Governor’s desk.
2. 2019 Legislative and Judicial Bail Reform Efforts
In November 2018, Nevadan’s voted for former Clark County Commissioner Steve Sisolak to become the state’s thirtieth Governor; the first Democratic governor in Nevada in two decades.473 On the campaign trail, Sisolak
signaled support for legislative efforts to reform the cash bail system474 by out-

468

See Discussion Section IV.A.2.
See Assemb. B. 38, 136, 250, 2017 Leg., 79th Legis. Sess. (Nev. 2017); S.B. 18 & 82,
2019 Leg., 79th Legis. Sess. (Nev. 2017). Texts of bills proposed during the 79th Legislative
Session are available at https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS/REL/79th2017/Bills/List
[https://perma.cc/C72S-FLYF].
470 Megan Messerly et al., On Deadline Day, Lawmakers Pass Bills on Cyber Security,
Heath Care and Campaign Finance, NEV. INDEP. (May 17, 2017, 2:15 AM),
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29,
2019,
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AM),
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474 Michael Lyle, Sisolak and Holder Discuss Justice Reform with Activists, NEV. CURRENT
(Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.nevadacurrent.com/2018/09/07/sisolak-and-holder-discussjustice-reform-with-activists/ [https://perma.cc/VK5X-BZCG].
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wardly supporting ending cash bail shortly after taking office in January
2019.475
a. Legislative Bail Reform Proposals
After months of research and assessment of the state’s criminal justice system, on March 8, 2019, Assemblyman Steve Yeager and Justice Hardesty presented a 136-page bill to the Judiciary Committee of the 80th Session of the
Nevada Legislature, Assembly Bill No. 236 (AB 236), which encompasses all
recommendations made by the ACAJ.476 In a presentation submitted to the
Committee, Assemblyman Yeager asserted that the enactment of all recommendations included in the bill would result in the state saving nearly “$640
million dollars by averting nearly 90 percent of the state’s prison population
growth.” As proposed, the bill has essentially “pitted prosecutors against public
defenders.”477 Proponents assert the bill provides necessary changes to an antiquated criminal justice system by investing in transition services for offenders
re-entering society, and has the goal of curbing a growing carceral population
and lower the recidivism rates.478 Opponents argue the bill compromises public
safety and are concerned about lesser punishment for certain crimes, particularly for habitual criminals, and “allow[ing] offenders who violate certain parts of
their probation to avoid having their probation revoked.”479 There is additionally a concern that the proposed legislation is ambitious, attempting to go too far,
too fast.480 AB 236 is being described as the “single most important and transformative” criminal justice legislation in the state’s history, and thus likely to
require significant effort by the legislative body to arrive at a proposal for criminal justice reform that gets all parties on board.481
Even in its formal presentation to the legislative body, AB 236 was not inclusive of significant reform to preventative detention or bail setting practices
in the state as a result of the omission of such recommendations on behalf of
the ACAJ. However, legislators in the Nevada Assembly have proposed various measure that focus on significant bail reform, one with the particular goal
of eliminating the cash bail system entirely. Unless otherwise specified by the

475

Rindels et al., supra note 473.
A.B. 236—Makes Various Changes Related to Criminal Law and Procedure, supra note
394; Ryan Tarinelli, Nevada Criminal Justice Reform Bill Heard by Lawmakers, LAS VEGAS
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language of the bill, if passed and signed by the Governor, the legislation specified below will take effect on October 1, 2019.482
i.

Assembly Bill 17

Hoping to continue the fight from the previous legislative session, the
Committee on Judiciary, on behalf of the Nevada Supreme Court, introduced
Assembly Bill No. 17 (AB 17) in the 2019 State of Nevada Legislature on February 4, 2019.483 This bill proposes changes to how posted bail is considered in
criminal and civil court proceedings by eliminating portions of the law that allow courts to avoid exonerating bail within thirty days of bail being posted.484
Instead, the bill requires a court to exonerate bail “if the charges against a defendant are dismissed or if no normal action is taken against a defendant.”485
Moreover, it amends a “section of law allowing the court to keep the bail and
apply it again if a defendant is charged with another offense ‘arising out of the
same act.’ ”486 On April 15, 2019, the bill adopted Amendment 35, which gives
the court discretion to “delay exoneration of the bail for a period not to exceed
30 days under certain circumstances.”487 On April 16, 2019, the Assembly
Committee on Judiciary passed AB 17, as amended, and sent the bill to the
Senate.488
ii.

Assembly Bill 125

On February 11, 2019, Assemblywoman Dina Neal and Assemblymen Edgar Flores and William McCurdy introduced Assembly Bill No. 125 (AB
125).489 This bill revises “provisions governing factors to be considered by the
court in deciding whether to release a person without bail; prohibiting a court
482

Lorne Malkiewich & Allison Combs, How a Bill Becomes a Law —Process, Presentation at Presession Academy for New Legislators 2011 (Jan. 19, 2011), available at
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/Research/LegInfo/Orientation/201011/Handouts/Jan19-24/1-19/08NVLegislativeProcess.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EKD-DTXN].
483 Assemb.
B. 17: Overview. 2019 Leg., 80th Legis. Sess. (Nev. 2019),
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS/REL/80th2019/Bill/5903/Overview
[https://perma.cc/6YHN-5WGB].
484 Michelle Rindels, et al., 2-Minute Preview: Legislature Still Dealing with Gun Background Checks, But Voting Rights and Antlers, Too, NEV. INDEP. (Feb. 13, 2019, 2:13 AM),
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487 2019 LEG., 80TH LEGIS. SESS., ASSEMBLY AMENDMENT TO ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 17, (Nev.
Apr.
8,
2019),
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/80th2019/Bills/Amendments/A_AB17_35.pdf
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B. 17: Overview, 2019 Leg., 80th Legis. Sess. (Nev. 2019),
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS/REL/80th2019/Bill/5903/Overview
[https://perma.cc/6YHN-5WGB].
489 Assemb. B. 125, 2019 Leg., 80th Legis. Sess. (Nev. 2019).
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from relying solely on a bail schedule in setting the amount of bail after a personal appearance by a defendant.”490 Specifically, when a court decides whether to release a person with bail, it “may use an evidence-based risk assessment
tool, if available, but at a minimum shall consider” factors enumerated under
NRS § 178.4853.491 The bill adds the following to the existing law’s noncomprehensive list:
Whether one or more conditions can be imposed on the person to mitigate the risk of failure to appear or the risk to public safety, including,
without limitation:
(a) Restrictions on residence or travel;
(b) Restrictions on associations, including, without limitation, requiring
the person to avoid contact with alleged victims or potential witnesses;
(c) Requiring the person to maintain or actively seek employment;
(d) Requiring the person to regularly report to a designated law enforcement agency or the court;
(e) Imposing a curfew;
(f) Prohibiting the possession of a firearm;
(g) Prohibiting the use of alcohol and controlled substances;
(h) Requiring the person to receive medical, psychiatric or psychological
treatment, including, without limitation, treatment for alcohol or drug
abuse or a mental illness;
(i) Intensive supervision of the person; or
(j) Any other condition reasonably necessary to ensure the appearance of
the person or the safety of any person in the community.

Moreover, the bill seeks to amend NRS § 178.498 by providing that after a
person “has personally appeared before the magistrate, the magistrate may not
rely solely on a standardized bail schedule to set the amount of bail.”492 On
April 12, 2019, Senate Majority Leader Nicole J. Cannizzaro and Speaker of
the Assembly Jason Frierson granted the waiver requested by the Assembly
Committee on Judiciary.493
iii.

Assembly Bill 203

On March 4, 2019, the Assembly Judiciary introduced Assembly Bill No.
203 (AB 203), which seeks to amend NRS Chapter 178 to provide that:
If . . . a defendant can be admitted to bail without appearing personally
before a magistrate, the defendant must be admitted to bail on an unsecured bond if the defendant:
Was arrested for:
(1) A misdemeanor; or
(2) A gross misdemeanor which does not involve an act of violence;
490
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See discussion supra Section IV.A.
492 Assemb. B. 203, 2019 Leg. 80th Legis. Sess. (Nev. 2019) (emphasis added).
493 ASSEMB. DAILY JOURNAL 2019 LEG., 80TH LEGIS. SESS. 3 (Nev. Apr. 15, 2019),
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/80th2019/Journal/Assembly/Final/aj071.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A2BW-5DBW].
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(b) Was not arrested while on bail; and
(c) Does not have a record of failing to appear after release on bail or
without bail.494

Concerns about the comprehensiveness of this proposed legislation arose
shortly after its introduction. Supporters of cash bail reform worry that the bill
will “leave too many loopholes for the district attorney, the police department,
or . . . law enforcement in general . . . to overcharge people.”495 For example,
some worry that if the law is implemented, those held on a misdemeanor might
be released on their own recognizance—but if the desire is to hold someone
behind bars, “they could easily up it to a felony,” thus drawing concern about a
possible increase in the number of felony charges.496 On April 13, 2019, pursuant to Joint Standing Rule No. 14.3.1, no further action was allowed on this
bill.497
iv.

AB 325

“Bail means jail, if you’re poor. [But for the rich], clout means you’re out!”498
On March 21, 2018, the Assembly Judiciary Committee heard Assembly
Bill 325 (AB 325).499 Before the start of the session there was speculation that
legislators sought to introduce a bill to eliminate cash bail in Nevada once and
for all.500 AB 325 instead overhauls the state’s cash bail system to ensure that
the assignment of bail, especially a high bail amount, is the last resort to “ensure reasonably the appearance of the [defendant] and the safety of the community.”501 The twenty-eight-page bill, as presented, is modeled after New Jersey’s set of bail reforms implemented in 2016.502 Notably, the bill “throws out”
the majority of the state’s laws regarding bail and “require[s] courts to release
nearly all individuals awaiting trial eligible for bail under the ‘least restrictive
conditions’ necessary for the person to show back up to court and ensure the
494
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496 Id.
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[https://perma.cc/LVD9-E3TC].
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Legis. Sess. (Nev. Mar. 21, 2019) (Testimony of Osvaldo E. Fumo, Assemb.),
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safety of the community.”503 Moreover, the bill mandates the “release prior to
trial or before an initial court appearance” of a defendant arrested and charged
for a misdemeanor or lower offense, unless the defendant’s underlying charge
is for domestic violence or a restraining order violation.504
The bill has drawn support from county “public defenders, the Americans
Civil Liberties Union of Nevada, the Culinary Union, the Mass Liberation Project as well as Americans for Prosperity.”505 Opposition to the bill comes primarily from law enforcement, county district attorneys, and bail bondsmen.506
For Carson City District Attorney Jason Woodbury, the opposition is not about
the idea of reform, rather it is directed at the “requirement that a pretrial release
hearing be held within 48 hours of a defendant’s initial appearance in court and
. . . [the] worry that victims’ rights are not addressed in the language” of the
bill.507
Critics of the proposed legislation, including the Nevada District Attorney’s Association, voiced several concerns including the debilitating effect its
enactment, if passed as presented, would have on a judge’s discretionary power: “A judge is going to be in the position to have the most information about
the specific case and about the individual accused at the earliest possible time.
But in order to do the best job he or she can the judge needs discretion.”508
Moreover, several district attorneys from across the state went on to highlight
areas of the bill that would limit judicial discretion such as: the mandatory release of anyone charged with a misdemeanor without bail; inability of judges to
create individualized conditions for a defendant’s release; and conflicts between AB 325’s release timeline and the recently passed Marsy’s law.509 District attorneys emphasized their willingness to work on bail reform in Nevada,
but stressed the need for judges to be able to act.510 When questioned on how
district attorney’s would be willing to help, Carson City’s District Attorney Jason Woodbury spoke on developing objective, data driven risk assessments to
give judges a tool to determine whether a defendant is likely to flee or be a
danger to the community.511 On April 12, 2019, Senate Majority Leader Nicole

503

Riley Snyder et al., 2-Minute Preview: 14-Year-Old Drivers, Major Bail Changes on
Deck
at
Legislature,
NEV.
INDEP.
(Mar.
21,
2019,
2:10
AM),
https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/2-minute-preview-14-year-old-drivers-major-bailchanges-on-deck-at-legislature [https://perma.cc/4TC6-MRDA].
504 Id.
505 Lochhead, supra note 499.
506 Id.
507 Id.
508 Hearing on Assemb. B. 325, supra note 498 (Testimony of Jason Woodbury, District Attorney, Carson City.).
509 Id.
510 Id.
511 Id.

3 NEV. L.J. FORUM 9

68

5/7/2019 10:51 AM

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL FORUM

[Vol. 3:9

Cannizzaro and Speaker of the Assembly Jason Frierson granted the waiver requested by the Assembly Committee on Judiciary.512
At the time of this article’s publication, the Nevada Legislature continued
to deliberate and work on these bills, which propose notable changes to improve the state’s pretrial process and seek to help maintain the presumption of
innocence. However, the opposition remained focused on whether these changes would make situations worse for the defendant or harder on the judiciary to
do its job. However, the legislative branch has not been the only branch of government seeking to improve Nevada’s pretrial decision-making process.
b. Judicial Bail Reform Proposal
On December 28, 2018, Associate Justice James Hardesty filed a petition,
based on the recommendation of the Committee to Study Evidence-Based Pretrial Release to adopt a “statewide requirement that all judges in Nevada utilize
a validated risk assessment tool for use in pretrial decision-making.”513 On February 5, 2019, the Nevada Supreme Court heard public comment on the proposal which, like AB 17, 125, and 206, looks to overhaul the bail system in the
state.514 Proponents of the risk assessment “tool argued that the ‘scoring items’
it uses to determine whether or not a defendant is a flight risk are based on science and that an overhaul of Nevada’s current system [is] long overdue.”515 On
the other hand, opponents “argued that some of the scoring items [stand] to disproportionately affect people of color and the poor.”516
Notable opposition came from the American Bail Coalition (ABC), an organization whose proffered mission is “protecting the Constitutional right to
bail and the promotion, protection and advancement of the surety bail profession in the United States.”517 The organization presented various points of opposition, including that:
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VEGAS REV. J. (Feb. 6, 2019, 3:34 PM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/politics-andgovernment/nevada/nevada-supreme-court-hears-proposal-to-overhaul-bail-system-1590810/
[https://perma.cc/TB4P-GRLX].
515 Id.
516 Id.; see discussion supra Section IV.A.2.
517 About Us, AM. BAIL COAL., http://ambailcoalition.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/Q77P9GNJ] (last visited Apr. 6, 2019).
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[1] [T]he Nevada Judiciary should not be in the business of approving a particular risk assessment algorithm or tool or requiring that judges use a particular tool
. . . [because it] creates an impermissible appearance of impropriety, calling into
question the objectivity of the Court.
...
[2] [O]ne-hundred ten national civil rights groups have called for an end to the
use of pretrial risk assessments in the United States of American primarily due
to concerns of racial bias and lack of transparency.
...
[3] [The] risk assessment under consideration relies heavily on demographic factors, such as employment, residential stability and age[,] . . . factors [that] could
have the exact opposite impact as intended.
...
[4] [The] risk assessment relies more heavily on un-convicted conduct than [others].
...
[5] [T]hese tools don’t work and have been shown to increase failures to appear
in court as required, increase crimes while on bail, and have virtually no impact
on the reduction of the pretrial population (and in some cases dramatically increasing the pretrial population).
...
[6] [A]t least one scholar blames the generational increases in mass incarceration
on the use of risk assessment tools and labeling people as dangerous which has
occurred and exploded in America’s penal system since 1970.
...
[7] [T]he tool . . . violate[s] the due process clause.518

Essentially, ABC’s assertion is that in implementing the risk assessment as
proposed, one that relies on demographic factors and unconvicted conduct and
has not been tested for “protected-class” bias, the Court is ignoring evidence
that the tool may disparately affect similarly situated people.519
On March 21, 2019, the Supreme Court of Nevada issued an Order Adopting Statewide Use of the Nevada Pretrial Assessment.520 In its Order, the Court
declared that it considered the concerns expressed by opponents of pretrial risk
assessments about the “potential racial bias implicit in the risk assessment
tool.”521 The Court sought a response from Dr. James Austin with the JFA Institute, who acknowledged “that there is no current evidence that the tool,
which is based on non-racial factors, increases racial disparities in pretrial release decisions.”522 Accordingly, the Court determined that implementation of
the NPR across Nevada’s counties is necessary.523
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Abcadmin, supra note 513.
Id.
520 Order Adopting Statewide Use of the Nevada Pretrial Risk Assessment, In re The Committee to Study Evidence-Based Pretrial Release, (Nev. 2019) (No. ADKT 0539).
521 Id. at 3.
522 Id.
523 Id.
519

3 NEV. L.J. FORUM 9

70

5/7/2019 10:51 AM

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL FORUM

[Vol. 3:9

V. RECOMMENDATIONS
As discussed, Nevada has slowly taken steps toward the implementation of
significant pretrial reform. Though past legislative efforts have fallen short of
effectuating change and there remains a significant amount of opposition targeted toward judicial reform efforts, Nevada has set itself up for a great opportunity to improve bail setting practices in its various jurisdictions and across the
state. It can do so by taking actionable steps through focusing and breaking
down reform efforts into actions for immediate and future implementation. Further, Nevada can address the different needs of its varying jurisdictions by allowing for flexibility based on a county’s population or specific needs.
Currently, Nevada’s pretrial justice system significantly limits a defendant’s access to justice by requiring a defendant to pay non-refundable fees or
post bail, forcing them to decide between freedom or hiring an attorney.524
Moreover, the system invites overcrowding of the jails and adversely impacts
the resolution of the defendant’s criminal case because those that are detained
prior to trial are more likely to be convicted.525 Pretrial detention also increases
the likelihood that the accused will plead guilty, negatively affects the accused’s personal life, and directly correlates to the likelihood that the accused
will commit another crime.526 Further, there are concerns regarding the practices of the commercial bail bond industry including there being no obligation to
provide bond to the presumably innocent, resulting in the denial of services to
an indigent defendant and the high likelihood for bondsmen and bounty hunters
to abuse the system through illegal behavior.527 Additionally, bondsmen’s practices are subjective because they can choose to not post bail for a defendant for
any reason.528 Lastly, the bail system implicates constitutional issues such as
due process and equal protection clause.529
While national incarceration rates fall, Nevada instead finds itself in a disappointing position as its carceral state continues its’ steady and alarming
growth. Now, more than ever, the Silver State needs to enact real and practical
solutions to curb detention and facilitate alternative pretrial options. Nevada
can overcome “bail means jail” issues by protecting a defendant’s liberty interest and ensuring public safety, while also allowing for the equitable and fair
administration of justice and lower incarceration rates. The following recommendations are practical steps broken down into three phases that Nevada can
take to curb deficiencies in its current bail practices, establish best practice pro-
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Miller, supra note 412, at 1248–49.
Id.
526 Id. at 1250.
527 Id. at 1251–52.
528 SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 108, at 15.
529 Wendy R. Calaway & Jennifer M. Kinsley, Rethinking Bail Reform, 52 U. RICH. L. REV.
795, 811 (2018).
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cedures to create a fairer system, and generate options for future creation and
implementation of an exemplary pretrial system.
Phase One refines Nevada’s current bail practices by eliminating bail
schedules, creating an inter-judiciary dialogue about the purpose and perils of
bail, and creating alternative bond opportunities for indigent defendants. This
phase is ready for immediate implementation with minimal disruption to current practices used in throughout the state. This first phase provides immediate,
equitable opportunities to defendants, regardless of their economic situation or
race.
Phase Two establishes a more objective based pretrial practice by implementing the use of an evidence based pretrial risk assessment in conjunction
with a pretrial options matrix. The goal of this hybrid tool is to reduce the number of incarcerated people, while eliminating factors that break down solely on
socioeconomic status. Effectuating this standard across Nevada’s counties and
municipalities creates a means by which to fight systematic injustices and allow
a defendant to prepare for trial with the least restrictive pretrial measures in
place.
Phase Three creates an option whereby Nevada counties with larger populations may move entirely away from a cash bail system and into a more integrated model of pretrial release and supervision. To accomplish this, counties
with a population of more than 100,000 would implement a dedicated pretrial
agency to provide important bail setting services to defendants during the pretrial period. These agencies would allow a defendant access to a third party
dedicated to helping them navigate their pretrial options while providing recommendations for the court to consider in any pretrial court appearances. These
agencies would primarily focus on developing the least restrictive means to ensure the defendant’s subsequent court appearances and public safety. Moreover,
agencies would administer an objective, evidence-based pretrial screening, and
conduct one-on-one interviews to determine a defendant’s risk for failure to
appear or potential to commit new criminal acts. Additionally, agencies would
provide the tools necessary to implement the decision matrix by monitoring defendants before trial, ensuring defendants make court appearances, and providing tools for defendants to get help prior to trial.
A. Phase One: Immediate Refinement of Current Bail Practices in Nevada
An immediate step for reform does not require an elimination of Nevada’s
current bail setting practices; rather, the first step requires that the state’s cash
bail system does what it is intended to do—ensure the appearance of defendants
while protecting public safety. By requiring the current bail system to ensure
defendants can prepare for trial with the presumption of innocence intact in the
least restrictive means necessary, the state’s bail system can promptly produce
fair and more equitable outcomes for defendants.
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An analysis of those most grossly affected by the negative aspects of bail—
those who are in pretrial detention simply because of an inability to pay—
reveal several possible improvements which will move current bail practices
from a simple “price for freedom” system to individualized measures that seek
to ensure a defendant’s court appearance and promote public safety. These
measures include determining a defendant’s ability to pay for a bond, providing
individualized bail determinations, and creating an option for defendants who
cannot obtain a commercial bond.530 The court’s consideration of such
measures should include mandating the least restrictive means for pretrial release.
1. Elimination: Bail Schedules
The purpose of cash bail is to incentivize a defendant to return to court as
required.531 However, tools such as blanket bail schedules used in some Nevada
jurisdictions do not allow the current system to routinely impose the least restrictive means imposed on a defendant. As discussed, bail schedules disproportionately affect indigent defendants because judges are free to set arbitrary
bail amounts, while failing to consider how much money incentivizes a defendant to return to court, or even if the defendant can afford to pay.532 By limiting
a presumed innocent defendant’s options based on their monetary circumstances, bail schedules go beyond an incentive to return to court and are instead a
restriction on a defendant’s constitutionally protected liberty interest. The authors therefore recommend that jurisdictions in Nevada eliminate their use of
bail schedules and instead use individual bail determinations based on a defendant’s ability to pay.
By eliminating bail schedules entirely, the courts would focus on the true
purpose of bail—a security that the defendant will return to make their court
appearance. Harvard Law School Criminal Justice Policy Program (CJPP) identified several factors that safeguard a defendant when determining their ability
to pay bail:
(1) [N]otice to the defendant that his “ability to pay” is a critical issue in the
contempt proceeding; (2) the use of a form (or the equivalent) to elicit relevant
financial information; (3) an opportunity at the hearing for the defendant to respond to statements and questions about his financial status, (e.g., those triggered by his responses on the form); and (4) an express finding by the court that
the defendant has the ability to pay.533

These safeguards ensure a defendant is not held in jail because of their inability to pay.534 The first safeguard allows the defendant to understand that their
530
531
532
533
534

MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 10, at 10.
Id. at 8.
See discussion supra Section III.A.
MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 10, at 10.
Id.
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ability to pay may be a factor in determining the amount of bail.535 The use of a
standardized form allows the court to assess the defendant’s income, financial
obligations, or other financial information to assist the court in a fair determination of the defendant’s bail.536 By giving defendants an opportunity to answer
questions about their responses in a hearing, the court can ensure that the responses in the form are fully explained.537 Further, by making express findings
on a defendant’s ability to pay, the court can ensure that the responses are wellreasoned, thus giving the defendant’s bail price a fully individualized consideration.538
The CJPP identified some suggestions for determining an individual’s ability to pay when setting bail. The financial factors a court could use to determine
whether a defendant can pay bail may also be collected during the court’s determining indigency as it relates to the assignment of government counsel.539 A
presumption of the inability to pay may be necessarily triggered if the defendant falls within a certain threshold already determined by the court for the purpose of representation.540 The court’s assurance that a defendant can pay their
bail fulfills the purpose of ensuring a defendant is actually incentivized to appear in court.541 Nevada courts can look to the CJPP’s identified factors to determine what level of bail would be the least restrictive, not only for indigent
defendants, but for all.542 The American Bar Association provided a similar
standard:
Financial conditions should be the result of an individualized decision taking into account the special circumstances of each defendant, the defendant’s ability to
meet the financial conditions and the defendant’s flight risk, and should never be
set by reference to a predetermined schedule of amounts fixed according to the
nature of the charge.543

The CJJP factors included the use of a standardized form to find relevant
financial information.544 By developing better forms to acquire relevant financial information, Nevada may also improve pretrial outcomes in other ways.
For example, one study conducted in New York found that by redesigning
criminal summons forms to feature a clear title, the date and location at the top
of a form where it is more likely to be read, as well as a clear description of the
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Id. at 11.
Id.
537 Id.
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539 Id.
540 Id.
541 Id.
542 Id. at 12.
543 AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE, Standard
10-5.3(e) (3d ed. 2007).
544 MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 10, at 11.
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consequences of a failure to appear, court appearance rates improved by 13
percent over the use of older forms cluttered with information at the bottom.545
By replacing bail schedules with individualized determinations of bail, the
court can ensure that Nevadans are not held in jail merely because of an inability to pay. Individualized bail determinations allow the court to determine what
amount of bail, if any, is needed to incentivize a defendant to return for their
court appearance. Further, by making individualized decisions, the court can
continue to use bail in situations where it would function as the least restrictive
means necessary to ensure a court appearance. Individualized bail determinations would also allow for stakeholders in the judicial system to engage in a
meaningful dialogue about the purpose of bail and the potential pitfalls of its
misapplication.
2. Inter-judiciary Cooperation
With the elimination of bail schedules, pretrial decisions would be based
on judicial discretion and statutory guidance. However, as illustrated above,
this “gut instinct” can lead to discrimination and injustice through implicit bias
and institutional barriers that affect poor and minority defendants. As such,
stakeholders in our justice system should engage in a meaningful dialogue that
focuses on the purpose of bail setting practices and the potential pitfalls of misapplied and inappropriate bail. This dialogue would be in the best interest of
those involved in the pretrial process who seek to make a concerted effort of
establishing fair and just pretrial practices. By creating a dialogue between
prosecutors, public defenders, and judges about the purpose and nature of bail
decisions, all parties can better understand that they are seeking to preserve the
presumption of innocence, ensure court appearances, and protect the public. By
taking these steps Nevada can begin to move towards using bail in only the
most necessary of circumstances and develop other options to allow indigent
defendants the same opportunity as defendants with greater financial resources.
To do this, Nevada should look to the example of inter-judiciary cooperation currently displayed in jurisdictions like Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington D.C. By refocusing on the purpose of bail, judicial stakeholders can advocate for more just decisions, account for public safety, and ensure that
defendants make their court appearances through the least restrictive means. By
starting from the position that pretrial decisions can lead to a defendant’s loss
of livelihood or housing because of their inability to pay bail, opposing sides in
pretrial decisions may be more likely to reach a cooperative solution that best
serves the demands of justice and provides greater social value.546
545

See USING BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE OUTCOMES, supra note
260, at 10–15.
546 Robert Veldman, Note, Pretrial Detention in Kentucky: An Analysis of the Impact of
House Bill 463 During the First Two Years of Its Implementation, 102 KY. L.J. 777, 781
(2014).
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One concrete example of how inter-judiciary cooperation can have a tremendous effect on bail practices and the lives of defendants is demonstrated in
UCLA Law’s work in Compton, California.547 The work being done by students there illustrates how developing the full picture of a client’s situation can
have a drastic effect on a judge’s bail decision.548 By openly dialoguing about
the perils of inappropriate bail, students were able to advocate for concrete results.549 By working with the client’s families and community supporters, they
were able to show judges the whole picture and obtain their clients’ release on
their own recognizance.550 These clients were then able to return to their families, keep their jobs, and some were even able to enter drug-treatment facilities.551
By shifting the focus away from a set price for freedom to one of purposeful pretrial decision making, defendants will have equal access to public defenders, prosecutors, and judges—who can then make people-driven decisions.
Stakeholders should engage in meaningful discussion about pretrial decisions
and the potential repercussions they might have on a defendant’s life. An open
dialogue about bail decisions would also allow stakeholders to address those
who have bail amounts too low for a commercial bond, yet still too expensive
for a defendant to afford.
The current commercial bail bond industry creates a gap between defendants who can afford to pay for the commercial fee and those whose bail is so
low that commercial bonds are not viable. A solution to this problem is to create the opportunity for unsecured or percentage-based bonds for indigent defendants. The authors therefore recommend that Nevada courts look into implementing the use of percentage-based or unsecured bonds for indigent
defendants who would not be able to secure a commercial bail bond and accordingly be detained.
As previously mentioned, an unsecured bond is an amount a defendant
would have to pay only if they fail to appear in court. A percentage bond, on
the other hand, requires a defendant to pay a percentage of the total bond directly to the court, instead of a commercial bondsman. By looking to states like
Illinois’s and Kentucky’s use of percentage-based or unsecured bonds, the
court could create a bridge between those who are too poor to afford a bail
bond and the more affluent defendants who can afford bail. In Illinois, only 8.2
percent of defendants released on percentage and unsecured bonds had their
bonds revoked.552
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Change in Compton, supra note 237; see also discussion supra Section III.B.i.
Id.
549 Id.
550 Id.
551 Id.
552 See discussion supra Section III.B.iv. It is also important to consider that while 33 percent of those revocations were for committing a new crime and 39 percent were for a failure
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Moreover, by creating a space for the indigent to obtain either an unsecured or percentage bond, Nevada would avoid pressure from commercial bail
bond industries. California faced significant pushback from the commercial
bonds industry when it passed SB 10.553 The American Bail Coalition sponsored a committee called “Californians Against the Reckless Bail Scheme.”554
This committee opposed the bill stating that it would cost tax payers millions
by endangering public safety, eliminating the service provided by bondsmen,
and further discriminating against the “poor and people of color.”555 By creating an adjacent space to the current bail industry, Nevada could avoid facing
opposition from the bond industry while creating the opportunity for those left
out by the bail industry to secure pretrial release.
If individual bail determinations are made and stakeholders can advocate
for the least restrictive means, an unsecured bond for indigent defendants might
be viable. This policy change should be driven by inter-judiciary cooperation.
Those involved in the pretrial process should communicate what percentage or
unsecured amount would be necessary to provide the proper incentive for court
appearance by a defendant.556 Further, by using a percentage bond, defendants
would pay an affordable price directly to the court and thus be more likely to
return for a court appearance so that they can retrieve their money. This system
would work better than AB 203’s proposal to release defendants arrested for a
misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor on an unsecured bond without going before a magistrate, because the bill as proposed would require a set bail schedule
to continue and fail to consider an individual’s ability to pay.
The diverse make up of Nevada’s counties may not mean that a statewide
percentage or unsecured bond system would work best in every county. Individual jurisdictions should have the freedom to implement whichever system,
unsecured or percentage based, works best, or even both if they determine that
is necessary.

to appear, the remaining 29 percent were revoked for violating a rule in relation to their court
bond. Id.
553 BREAKING: Nearly 600,000 Signatures Submitted by Coalition to Overturn California
Bail
Legislation,
SB-10,
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COALITION
(Nov.
20,
2018),
http://www.americanbailcoalition.org/in-the-news/breaking-nearly-600000-signaturessubmitted-by-coalition-to-overturn-california-bail-legislation-sb-10/ [https://perma.cc/ZA8E67ZU].
554 NO ON SB 10, https://www.stopsb10.org/ [https://perma.cc/4LEP-67BM] (last visited
Apr. 6, 2019).
555 We Have the Power to Stop SB 10, CALIFORNIANS AGAINST THE RECKLESS BAIL SCHEME,
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With the above-mentioned actions, Phase One can focus Nevada’s current
bail practices on the least restrictive means necessary to ensure a defendant’s
court appearance. By shifting the focus to what can a defendant pay instead of a
set price on freedom, fewer defendants will find themselves in jail merely because they are unable to post bail. Further, if a judge does feel a financial constraint is necessary, the court can create a system that would not require an indigent defendant to go to a commercial third party.
B. Phase Two: Implementation of Statewide Reforms to Current Pretrial
Practices
The current use of judicial discretion and “gut instinct” increases the possibility for significant civil liberties violations of indigent defendants and people
of color.557 Inherent bias against minorities and the poor allow subjective opinions to become the basis of pretrial decisions.558 Nevada is best served by investing time and money into developing longer term solutions for pretrial practices that develop objective standards by which pretrial decisions can be made.
These solutions should include the development of a pretrial risk assessment
that accounts for the specific factors pretrial conditions are meant to prevent,
like failure to appear or commission of a new criminal act, and a correlated matrix that provides for the least restrictive means of pretrial release. To reinforce
the use of a risk assessment tool in conjunction with a decision-making matrix,
implementing jurisdictions should require training for stakeholders. This training would help account for the “human element” and inherent bias.
This reform phase additionally calls for an algorithmic based risk assessment tool like the one suggested and being tested in four jurisdictions by the
Supreme Court of Nevada’s Committee to Study Evidence-Based Pretrial Release. The proposed algorithmic tool could build on the foundation established
by the implementation of the Supreme Court of Nevada Committee’s risk assessment tool. Further, this algorithmic risk assessment tool should be coupled
with a personal interview process. By merging a scientifically-based algorithmic system with an interview-based model, pretrial services can create individualized pretrial plans that accounts for a defendant’s risk to the community, ensures his appearance in court, and considers the burden that pretrial conditions
would place on a presumptively innocent person.
The most recent version of the NPR contained adjustments to the original
nine factors.559 These adjustments included changing accounting for arrests to
accounting only for actual convictions, lowering the value of the unemployment score, lowering of the value of cellphone/landline value, and an overall
557

See discussion supra Sections II.B.iii, V.A.ii.
See generally Matthew Clair & Alix S. Winter, How Judges Think About Racial Disparities: Situational Decision-Making in the Criminal Justice System, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 332
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rescaling of the risk level.560 Importantly, these adjustments illustrated the judiciary’s willingness to test the correlation of different NPR factors and their predictive accuracy with whether a defendant was rearrested for a new crime or
whether a bench warrant was issued for a failure to appear.561 These adjustments also revealed that the NPR was a “statistically valid pretrial risk instrument that meets industry standards in terms of the factors being used and their
overall predictive accuracy.”562
Jurisdictions in Nevada should adopt a scaling system of pretrial measures
like that created by the PSA. Because the PSA is designed to predict risk in
three areas, risk of failure to appear (FTA), risk of new criminal activity
(NCA), and risk of new violent criminal activity (NVCA), it has a developed
scale of restrictions to match the risk in each category.563 In a recent Administrative Order, the Nevada Justice Court implemented a new methodology for
pretrial services to use in determining pretrial release for defendants.564 The
Order states that defendants brought in on an arrest of probable cause for a
nonviolent misdemeanor without prior arrest should be released.565 It further
states that where the charges are non-violent felonies and/or gross misdemeanors, pretrial services should administer the NPR and release the defendants if
they are rated low on the NPR scale, or release those arrested for felony and/or
gross misdemeanor possession if their NPR is low or moderate.566 The Order
goes on to establish a list of conditions that indicate a defendant shall not be
permitted release that include failure to appear, risk of new violent criminal activity (NVCA), and new criminal activity (NCA) factors.567
While the court’s order is a step in the right direction to establish a method
of least restrictive pretrial release, it may be an overcorrection. Under the Order, the options for pretrial decision break down to “release” or “shall not release,” without providing other options or conditions for release. Simplifying
the complex problems that developed within bail reform to release or shall not
release, actually creates a higher potential for defendants to slip through on either side. This system additionally affects those who would be better served by
some method of conditional pretrial release and those who should have been
placed in pretrial detention. By developing a scale with more than two levels,
pretrial services in Nevada would be able to develop more pretrial options that
serve both the rights of individuals charged and the demands of justice. This
560
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scale could be used in conjunction with other data driven tools to allow judges
to make informed decisions about what pretrial conditions would be the least
restrictive means of ensuring a defendant returns for their court appearance.
1. Develop an Options Matrix to be Used in Conjunction with Pretrial
Risk Assessment
As illustrated, New Jersey’s use of the PSA combined with the Decision
Making Framework (DMF) allows for a more individualized plan that allows
the defendant to be released on the least restrictive means, while using modern
resources to provide the most likely incentive for the defendant to appear and
ensure public safety.568 As jurisdictions across Nevada seek to implement evidence-based risk assessment tools, these tools should be used within the context
of the purpose of bail and jurisdictions should understand the valuations of the
assessment. If a defendant is low in terms of failure to appear (FTA), but moderate in terms of a risk for new criminal activity (NCA) level, it would likely be
appropriate to devise some method of supervision during release to ensure no
criminal activity occurs. Further, if a defendant is ranked high solely in the
FTA category, electronic supervision may be enough to ensure appearance in
court while not disrupting the defendant’s life before trial.
The more options pretrial services have beyond a simple “release” or “detain” will allow them to customize circumstances for the best of the individual
and the community. Use of a correlated decision-making matrix, like implementing personalized bail decisions, would allow for a more equitable outcome
before the court. When individuals are treated in this manner, they are no longer held back by inherent bias against their race or systematic injustice because
of their socioeconomic status. A tailored pretrial plan would allow the system
to better protect the presumption of innocence by allowing defendants the best
opportunity to prepare for trial while maintaining order in their lives.
However, AB 325 likely goes too far in creating a statewide reform so
quickly. As seen by the example of New Jersey’s reforms, the implementation
of the PSA can be a costly affair that may not be cost efficient for all jurisdictions. While AB 325 emphasizes cash bail as a last resort for least restrictive
means, it seeks to establish more equitable pretrial solutions. The bill also creates potential danger of forcing the practice on jurisdictions that may not be
prepared. Moreover, the implementation of the bill may result in longer pretrial
detention times in jurisdictions that have already made positive strides in pretrial reform, the taking away of judicial discretion, and conflicting with existing
laws, such as the recently enacted Marsy’s law.569 A better solution would be a
potential roll out plan, with state support for the new systems.
To account for these pitfalls between human objectives and algorithmic assessment, the algorithmic system can be merged with an interview system like
568
569

See discussion supra Section II.B.iii.
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that used in Washington D.C. By conducting an in-person interview of the defendant, the subjective goals of a person can be merged with the objective goals
of an algorithm. A trained pretrial service representative could develop the information within the factors of the risk assessment algorithm, allowing the defendant to have the best of both worlds. A system combining both objective
risk assessments with interviews would allow judges to make discretionary decisions for defendants who may have extenuating circumstances or who are being charged with a crime that the judge feels does not warrant the restrictions
suggested by the algorithm.
As stated above, critics of risk assessments state that the tools themselves
are drawn from unreliable data that may have bias already baked into the numbers. An important counter to this inherent bias is diligent training on what the
risk assessment is meant to predict and what the numbers really mean. By training users of risk assessments on what the tools’ outcomes mean, judges will be
better able to understand that the test is accurately aligning with their own experience. Further, by using the results of risk assessments to refine what test
factors are indicative of a defendant’s failure to appear and new criminal activity, administrators of the tool can evaluate what bias may still be in the system.
This type of evaluation can be used to help further eliminate biased factors and
refine the results of the tool.
It is additionally important that jurisdiction across Nevada consider bias
training for those who are involved in the pretrial decision-making process. Bias training can also allow for discretionary decision makers to understand their
own inherent bias and help them better evaluate their own decisions and counteract whatever biases they may have. These bias trainings could include selftests of social cognition, like Project Implicit, which allows people to see what
hidden biases they may have.570 By creating an atmosphere of understanding
and education, advocates and judges involved in pretrial decisions will create a
system that provides for public safety without creating a taxing social cost.
Nevada should remain cautious in the amount of discretion given to judges
in determining pretrial release and bail options. While organizations like the
ACLU and Human Rights Watch initially supported California’s SB 10 in its
elimination of cash bail, the groups eventually opposed the law because they
feared it gave judges too much power and would lead to more people behind
bars.571 Critics feared that by giving judges “absolute power” in a state where
judges are elected officials, judges might be tempted to “pander to law-and570
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order voters” by favoring detention to release.572 A counter to this critique
would be an emphasis that judges consider public safety first, but do so in balance with the needs of defendants and their individual circumstances.573 Further, in using their discretion to override a pretrial risk assessment and its proposed conditions regarding pretrial release or detention, judges should be sure
to focus on specific risks associated with individual defendants, and not “statistical probabilities or vague generalities.”574 The requirement for a specific explanation in writing of why a judge diverted from the recommendation could
also be used to counter potential critics of judicial discretion.575 This would ultimately allow the judge to have the discretion necessary to make individualized decisions, while maintain a “check” on this discretion.
2. System Accountability
While these implementations will likely help separate the gap in justice between the affluent and the indigent, the only way jurisdictions will know what
effect these changes are having on the system is to monitor and reevaluate.
With periodic audits and evaluations of pretrial decision-making processes,
stakeholders will better understand what is having a positive impact on the system and what causes deficiencies. The authors therefore recommend that with
the implementation of Phase Two, a set period of trial, audit, and evaluation
should be put into place to give changes the opportunity to produce quantifiable
results.
Evaluation will allow pretrial risk algorithms to improve and eliminate bias. Following the standstill of California’s SB 10, law makers introduced a proposal to help prevent improper use and biased conclusions by requiring counties to report on their use of risk assessment tools.576 This supplementary
legislation falls in line with recommendations given by Human Rights
Watch.577 In their recommendations following their condemnation of SB 10’s
potential pitfalls, Human Rights Watch recommended that state and local governments develop uniform, systematic collection of data based on detention and
release decisions and court outcomes to account for fairness in court decisions
and evaluate biases like race and economic status.578 In regards to algorithmic
572
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pretrial assessment tools, Human Rights Watch further recommends complete
transparency with any formula or algorithm used and the underlying data used
in risk assessments.579 Data transparency should be accompanied with some
sort of “mechanism for public oversight” and the ability to audit the pretrial assessment tool for calibration and adjustment.580 These safeguards would allow
jurisdictions to create an evolving tool. By auditing the assessment on a yearly
basis and re-calibrating it, a commission on public oversight can eliminate or
add factors that move the tool away from biased decisions and can find factors
that contribute to understanding defendants’ frequency for failure to appear,
and the risk for new criminal activity (NCA) and new violent criminal activity
(NVCA).
These evaluations can be used to refine steps made to bail reform or even
further develop algorithmic risk assessments. Evaluations could further help to
reconcile Professor Stevenson’s stated problem of measuring an algorithm’s
results with actual human objectives. By comparing algorithmic results with
actual results for failure to appear (FTA) scores, risk for new criminal activity
(NCA), and risk of new violent criminal activity (NVCA), pretrial decisionmakers will better understand the value of the factors incorporated into in risk
assessment tool.581 In assessing the data, the evaluation could look to the quantitative results of implementation (number of defendants released on bail, reduction in jail population, etc.) and qualitative results (impressions of attorneys
and judges, experiences of defendants, etc.). This process could lead to the development of other factors or the elimination of factors that propagate systematic biases. Also, these tools could establish more capable Pretrial Agencies,
should jurisdictions wish to implement Phase Three.
C. Phase Three: Creation of Pretrial Agencies in Counties with Populations
over 100,000 to Coincide with the Elimination of Cash Bail
One problem with statewide reform in Nevada is its unique geographical
makeup. Issues prevalent in Washoe and Clark County can be trivial in comparison to issues faced in more rural counties. Further, rural counties may lack
the financial and human capital that might make widespread implementation of
any major state reform to bail insurmountable. As such, the authors recommend
a specific step for Phase Three based solely on population.
Phase Three creates pretrial agencies in counties with populations of over
100,000 people to coincide with the elimination of cash bail. These agencies
would be an alternative to the current system by implementing the risk factor
assessment and interview steps from Phase Two, combined with emerging
technologies to ensure adequate pretrial supervision. These agencies could
model themselves after D.C.’s PSA. In their self-evaluation of pretrial reform
579
580
581
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and the elimination of cash bail, the state of New Jersey stated that the current
operation of their Pretrial Services Program was facing problems with funding,
defendant social problems, and issues with technology.582 While New Jersey
planned to operate their pretrial service agencies solely via court fees, this
turned out to be ultimately be unsustainable. Court staff were unable to assist
defendants with mental health issues, housing, and/or cases of substance abuse.
Further, the state struggled to implement reliable electronic monitoring across
all jurisdictions in the state. Essentially, New Jersey found that a state-wide,
one-size-fits-all solution was not feasible.
Phase Three intends that should more population dense counties want to
fully move away from a cash bail system, they should follow the example set
by D.C.’s PSA. While the efforts of D.C.’s PSA are worth emulating, it is important to remember that D.C. is a metropolitan area, with relatively easy access to defendants in an interconnected geographical area as compared to other
large cities. D.C.’s PSA also receives funding of almost $65 million dollars a
year.583 While the services and tools D.C.’s PSA use may be scalable to smaller
jurisdictions, there is likely a better cost-benefit to using a dedicated pretrial
service in jurisdictions with more available funds.
1. A Full Service Pretrial Agency
If counties in Nevada wish to fully eliminate cash bail, they will need to
take the appropriate steps to ensure that a system is in place to facilitate incentives for defendants to appear, monitor defendants out on release for further
crimes, and protect the community at large from potentially violent actions.
These agencies, like current pretrial divisions, could be dedicated to the presumption of innocence and release.584 While both Clark and Washoe County’s
pretrial services divisions are currently focused on facilitating tighter turn
arounds between arresting agencies and judges, these agencies might need to
take on more if a county wishes to eliminate money bail.
A dedicated pretrial agency could do all initial intake for arresting agencies. After a person is arrested, they could be brought directly to a pretrial service case manager who would gather information about the defendant for use in
the pretrial risk assessment tool. The case manager could further conduct interviews designed to help discuss subjective topics needed during pretrial decisions. Personal interview information could further be used in determining if
the defendant is likely to need a public defender or substance abuse assistance.
Case managers could then facilitate the use of the pretrial decision matrix
implemented in Phase Two to create a proper recommendation for the deciding
582
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judge. By taking in the factors of the defendant’s algorithmic results and personal interview, these pretrial recommendations would more fully compliment
the defendant’s individual circumstances. For example, if a defendant lacks a
mobile phone, that would likely count against them within an evidence-based
risk assessment tool. However, during a personal interview, a case manager determines how to best contact the defendant. A greater understanding of the defendant’s circumstances would allow the case manager to make a more particularized recommendation, allowing the defendant to still be released and
contacted.
A dedicated, full service pretrial agency is likely to help facilitate defendant appearances in court. By creating a dedicated pretrial service agency like
D.C.’s PSA, Nevada counties could facilitate a relationship between case managers and defendants, like the D.C. model. Dedicated pretrial service agencies
would allow those working through the pretrial process to have a support system to help them appear in court at the appropriate time. D.C.’s PSA saw appearance rates of 88 percent by creating a system that uses case managers, reminders, and potential pretrial supervision.585 Further, with a system of
managing and monitoring, a full-service pretrial agency would be equipped
with the appropriate information when defendants failed to make court appearances.
Under current Nevada law, if a commercial bond agency receives notification of a defendant’s failure to appear, they have 180 eighty days to produce the
client or give an adequate reason for a failure to appear.586 If counties were to
eliminate commercial bonds altogether, the county would need to facilitate the
recovery of defendants. By creating an integrated agency, case managers would
be able to monitor a defendant’s compliance with the conditions and/or rules of
supervision. This would allow case managers to be more aware that a defendant
is likely to fail to make a court appearance, and act preventatively rather than
reactionarily to a failure to appear. Further, by being involved in supervision
and maintaining direct contact with defendants, a pretrial agency would have
the information about a defendant’s likely location, contacts, and/or aliases. A
dedicated pretrial agency could monitor defendants for new criminal acts and
facilitate tools to help defendants avoid new criminal acts. By monitoring defendants and giving them the opportunity and tools to properly prepare for trial,
a pretrial agency could help mitigate the risk that defendants out on pretrial release will commit new criminal acts. The agency can monitor via over the
phone check-in’s, in person check-in’s, or even electronic monitoring.
With a dedicated agency, tools could be put in place to automatically send
text reminders to defendants informing them of their court dates and potential
585
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consequences for failure to appear. These and other messages from a dedicated
agency would help to reduce failure to appear rates and therefore also reduce
the number of bench warrants issued.587 For example, the Las Vegas Justice
Court’s Pretrial Service Division has implemented an automated system to send
reminder texts for required supervision check-ins.588 A reduction in the number
of bench warrants issued would create a reduction in the risk new criminal activity (NCA) committed by defendants.
It is documented that drug users are more likely than nonusers to commit
crimes,589 which can be partially attributed to the fact that it is a crime to possess, manufacture, or use many drugs.590 One Bureau of Justice Statistics study
in 2006 found that 17 percent of state prisoners and 18 percent of federal inmates committed offenses to get money for drugs.591 In 2012, the White
House’s Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring report (ADAM II) findings showed
that 60 percent of arrestees tested positive for some drug at the time of their arrest.592 Fewer than a third of those arrested had ever been in outpatient or inpatient drug or alcohol treatment.593
As mentioned above, one of the problems faced by New Jersey’s statewide
bail reformation was the ability for pretrial service agencies to assist with substance abuse. A dedicated pretrial service agency could partner with or even
develop programs to help defendants with substance abuse or drug related issues. By offering access to social services, a pretrial service agency would be a
positive step towards not only developing a more equitable court system, but
towards defendants’ rehabilitation. By giving defendants access to tools that
might help them overcome issues with substance abuse the agencies can help
move the defendants away from the criminal lifestyle that may have influence
on their habits.
A dedicated pretrial agency could develop and facilitate the use of more
modern uses of electronic monitoring. By properly using and maintaining electronic monitoring systems, and then communicating with judges and other judicial stakeholders about the benefits of electronic monitoring, case managers
could help overcome any unfamiliarity with or doubt about electronic monitor-
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ing systems.594 One study found that many judges were unfamiliar with or only
somewhat familiar with electronic monitoring programs.595 This study further
stipulated that funding was a concern for electronic monitoring but that by using portions of jail budgets, overall impact on budgetary concerns would be alleviated and would ultimately cost less than detaining a defendant.596
A full service agency would need to find its place in the criminal justice
system. Human Rights Watch recommended to governments looking at bail reform that pretrial service departments and probation departments should be
separate.597 This separation is to ensure that a pretrial agency is focused solely
on helping get people to court and providing access to other services like mental health counseling or voluntary drug treatment.598 But if the agency, from its
inception, is focused on not only aiding defendants pretrial, but also monitoring
those under conditional supervised release, jurisdictions could eliminate interagency communication break downs and have a greater opportunity to ensure
court appearance and public safety.
While pretrial supervision is likely to help with court a defendant’s failure
to appear and give defendants a greater opportunity for equitable treatment in
court, there may not be a statistical link between pretrial supervision and “no
criminal arrest.” A study in 2013 by the LJAF found defendants who were
deemed moderate to high risk by a risk assessment tool and given supervised
release for more than 180 days were 12 to 36 percent less likely to have an
NCA, risk of new criminal activity, score.599 However, because some models
showed a statistically significant relationship while others only approached statistical significance, the LJAF found these findings to be tentative.600 Supervised release is an important consideration when thinking of eliminating cash
bail, given that this model was run on defendants who scored moderate to high
risk for a new criminal activity (NCA). A dedicated pretrial service agency
could be used to help limit the danger of new criminal acts being committed in
the community at large.
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2. The Problem with Statewide Reform
While the PJI gave New Jersey’s efforts an “A”, the state acknowledged
that it was floundering under its new policy implementation. Should Nevada
wish to move away from cash bail and towards more equitable release standards, it must remember the issues highlighted by New Jersey and the missteps
made by California. New Jersey took two years to implement their move away
from bail and still came up short on funds. California’s move away from cash
bail created a fear that more defendants will end up in pretrial detention than
before. New Jersey and California both seemingly failed to tailor their reforms
to the needs of individual jurisdictions.
By using the resources and infrastructure of more urban counties, Nevada
can use these pretrial agencies as examples of effective methods for pretrial release. A dedicated agency in higher population counties in Nevada can be used
as a proving ground. By monitoring the results and analyzing what parts of the
pretrial agency have the greatest effect on creating equitable outcomes, rural
counties in Nevada can then scale down these types of services and fit them to
their needs. For example, in counties with larger geographic areas it might be
harder to facilitate in person check-ins. But if a larger, more populated county
found that in person check-ins had a smaller effect on failure to appear and new
criminal activity than automated messaging, a rural county might invest resources into an automated messaging system.
The implementation of these phases may take the form of a statute or administrative action in individual jurisdictions. After analyzing both success and
failures of jurisdictions outside Nevada, the authors recommend the phases of
reform be implemented by administrative bodies in individual jurisdictions
overseen by a central statewide body to provide guidance and resources, similar
to pretrial reform in Illinois and Pennsylvania.601 This would allow administrative bodies to rollout reform in a manner that does not inhibit or counteract current efforts to improve the pretrial detention system, rather than forcing jurisdictions to accommodate a one-size-fits-all approach.
Further, a state-sponsored body will provide a ground for judges and others
involved in pretrial services to be confident in the tools used to set bail in a
more equitable and just manner, as well as provide a body that has the capability and resources to evaluate, update, and improve these tools with real and
tested data. Moreover, the State Legislature may use these to develop a plan for
gradual implementation, to allow jurisdictions to effectively and efficiently implement changes to ensure the least restrictive means are imposed in all pretrial
decisions. Overall, the purpose of these recommendations is to develop methods to ensure the only reasons a person is detained during the pretrial process is
if they are either a danger to the community or likely to flee. No person should
have to spend time detained before they are convicted of a crime merely because they do not have the means to pay for their freedom. By implementing
601
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these phases, jurisdictions in Nevada can move away from the problems that
have arisen in modern bail systems, while avoiding the growing pains many
other jurisdictions are experiencing.
CONCLUSION
In an everchanging social climate, archaic legal traditions must evolve to
meet the social challenges of today. In an age of mass incarceration where the
poor are often trapped in pretrial detention due to the inability to afford bail,
state legislatures and judiciaries need to adapt bail proceedings to protect the
constitutional rights of the citizenry and avoid the harms of cash bail bonds.
Such harms can be legal and social in nature, ranging from the data-supported
fact that pretrial detainees are more likely to plead guilty independent of their
own culpability to the impoverished losing employment because they cannot
financially post bail. To remedy the detriments resulting from cash bail, this article advocates its eventual abolishment and replacement with alternative and
less restrictive means to achieve the same overall policy rationale.
Recently, the United States has entered a new stage of bail reform to move
away from a “tough on crime” stance towards a more defendant-oriented means
of pretrial release. States have approached this goal by enacting legislation such
as the reduction of cash bail, the use of pretrial risk assessments, and even a
limitation as to the number of defendants who can be held in pretrial detention.
In 2018, California passed Senate Bill 10, the California Money Bail Reform
Act, which required judges to consider the defendant’s finances when instituting bail and entertain possible noneconomic means for pretrial release. The Act
was met with opposition as prominent organizations such as the American Civil
Liberties Union feared expansive judicial discretion that would further promulgate inequalities amongst minorities and the impoverished. Nevertheless, despite opposition, UCLA School of Law joined with other criminal justice advocacy groups to launch a pilot program with the goal of eliminating or reducing
bail for felons who remain incarcerated merely because they cannot financially
afford bail. This program has reported successes such as pretrial release or induction into drug rehabilitation facilities to await trial. This glimmer of hope, in
conjunction with other reform efforts such as the establishment of Washington
D.C.’s Pretrial Services Agency and New Jersey’s algorithmic pretrial assessment, demonstrate that bail reform efforts are having positive effects even if the
measures up to this point remain imperfect.
Nevada, however, still suffers from high incarceration rates, incapacitating
more people on average than other states, at a rate that is 15 percent higher than
the national average. Such incarceration has incurred substantial costs. Since
2012, spending in relation to high incarceration has risen 20 percent each year.
Nevada’s cash bail system is founded upon some of the most detailed and comprehensive statutes in the country. While the Nevada Constitution prohibits excessive bail, judicial discretion becomes the ultimate factor in determining if an
arrestee will receive pretrial release and if so, upon what terms that release is
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conditioned. Many of Nevada counties employ standardized bail schedules, but
they remain nonuniform in practice.
Despite high incarceration and bail inconsistencies in the state, Nevada has
been slow to enact bail reform. For this purpose, this article makes several bail
reform recommendations to defy the harms of the cash bail system, introducing
the reforms as phases. In Phase One, bail schedules should be eliminated to
promote dialogue regarding current bail procedure, endorse alternative bail
practices, and instill principles of equality. Phase Two advocates the implementation of a more objective-based pretrial practice through the use of an evidence-based pretrial risk assessment within a pretrial options matrix. In doing
so, the process will eradicate socioeconomic factors that rely upon race or class
for bail determinations. As for Phase Three, in counties with a population of
100,000 people or more, cash bail will be completely abandoned and replaced
by a pretrial agency dedicated to bail setting services like that of Washington
D.C. Such an agency would provide invaluable help to defendants to obtain release and ultimately navigate all pretrial proceedings while also considering the
safety concerns and flight risk of allowing the defendant back into the community. By following these Phases, the new bail process will protect Nevadans
from the misgivings of the current cash bail system.

